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Executive Summary 
This deliverable of Work Package No 5 assesses the engagement of the EU with the AU and other 
intergovernmental organisations in Africa. Through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), the EU and its 
member states on the one hand and the AU and African states on the other hand have committed 
themselves to work towards the realisation of joint values such as human rights. The deliverable 
consists of eight chapters. 
The first chapter sets out the aims, conceptual framework, methodology and structure of the report. 
The second chapter explores the place of human rights and multilateralism in the EU, with a focus on 
the EU treaties, guidelines on human rights and the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human 
Rights. 
The third chapter discusses the institutional framework related to promotion and protection of human 
rights in the AU and other African intergovernmental organisations with a human rights mandate such 
as the EAC and ECOWAS. The chapter also consider the major EU human rights stakeholders of 
relevance to relations with Africa. 
The fourth chapter considers substantive goals and objectives in relation to the EU human rights policy 
towards Africa and goals and objectives enshrined in international agreements between the EU and 
African states, including the Cotonou Agreement and JAES. The chapter further discusses the JAES 
roadmap and action plans, sub-regional cooperation strategies and EU member state initiatives in 
relation to human rights. 
The fifth chapter studies the tools and methods employed by the EU at African intergovernmental 
organisations. Particluar attention is given to the human rights dialogue between the EU and the AU. 
The chapter also considers other initiatives such as the Africa-EU Platform for Dialogue on Governance 
and Human Rights, the EU-Africa Summit, the EU-Africa High Level Policy Dialogue, the Commission-
to Commission meetings and sub-regional political dialogues. 
The sixth chapter considers the EUs and its member states important role in providing financing for 
the AU and other African intergovernmental organisations.  The chapter consider issues such as aid 
earmarking and coordination. 
The seventh chapter consists of two case studies, one focusing on food security and the other on 
human rights defenders.  
The report illustrates how the relationship between the EU and the AU and other African regional IOs 
has become more equal in recent years and that Africa is now treated as one unit, represented by the 
AU. Challenges remain in relation to making the relationship functioning effectively, in particular in 
light of the numerous actors involved in EU-Africa relations, including EU and AU member states, AU 
institutions, RECs and civil society actors. The effectiveness of interventions such as the EU-AU human 
rights dialogue in promoting EU human rights strategies is questionable, in particular in light of the 
divergent opinions on many issues despite the slogan of ‘two unions, one vision’. Financing from the 
EU plays an important role for African intergovernmental organisations to perform their functions. 
However, reliance on donor funding remains controversial and coordination among donors could still 
be improved.   
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‘Relations between the European Union and Africa rank first among the EU’s top political 
priorities. Both continents are bound by strong ties of friendship and interconnected 
future.’1 
 
I. Introduction 
A. Aim 
Considering that the European Union (EU) is committed to ‘develop relations and partnerships with ... 
regional organisations which share [its] principles’,2 the aim of this study is to critically map and 
provide an assessment of the EU’s intricate and long-established cooperation within and towards the 
African Union (AU) (until 2002 the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)) and other African inter-
governmental organisations (IOs).  
The relationship between European and African countries has a long history, has taken many forms 
and is perceived differently by different actors depending on the assessor’s experience, perspective 
and interests.3 It has gone from a colonial-colonised relationship to a confrontational one and more 
recently to a consultative engagement between the two continents,4with increased multilateral 
engagement between the EU and the AU. 
This new relationship between ‘one Africa’ and ‘one Europe’ is geared towards an ambitious goal of 
‘two unions, one vision’.5 The nature and scope of the relationship is such that it is meant to be beyond 
development aid and trade, to include issues of political concern; beyond Africa, to address not only 
African matters but global issues; beyond institutions, to ensure the participation of the people and 
the strengthening of the civil society; and beyond a fragmented approach to Africa, to find regional 
and continental responses.6 
Respect for human rights and good governance has for decades figured prominently in the major 
frameworks guiding the relationship between the two continents. These partnership framework  
agreements include the Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) group of 
                                                          
1 Jose-Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission quoted in ‘The Africa-EU partnership - 2 unions, 1 vision’ 7.  
2Art 21(1) TEU. 
3 Jack Mangala ‘Africa-EU partnership on democratic governance and human rights’ in Jack Mangala (ed.) Africa and the 
European Union: A strategic partnership (Palgrave 2012) 77. 
4Mangala (n 3) 74. See also interview with AU official, May 2015. 
5 See http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/jaes_en_brochure_final_web.pdf. 
6 The Africa-EU strategic partnership: A joint Africa-EU strategy 2007 para 26.  
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states;7 the European Neighbourhood Policy;8 the so-called Barcelona Process,9 Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (now European Neighbourhood Policy) with North African states (Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt), as well as the Union of the Mediterranean10 and now the EU-Africa Partnership. 
The AU, comprising 54 states is the main regional body in Africa. Its activities are complemented by 
eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) recognised by the AU as building blocks towards an 
African Economic Community: theArab Maghreb Union (AMU); the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); East African 
Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). 
The relationship between the EU and AMU is not covered in this report as the focus is on EU’s 
relationship with pan-African and sub-Saharan African IOs. The research will also touch on the 
relationship between the EU and the ACP Group of States and the African negotiating groups for 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) to the extent that these differ from the RECs. The 
relationship with ACP and the role of EPAs will be discussed in more detail in D6.4. 
This report critically assesses the EU’s engagement with African IOs and their institutions with 
relevance for human rights promotion and protection with a view to understand the EU’s role in 
shaping the policies of these IOs and ensure their effective functioning, including through financial 
contributions. In addition to a critical assessment of the EU’s role vis-à-vis these organisations, ways 
to facilitate a critical but constructive and effective relationship will be explored. 
In addition to agreements and policies of the EU as such, the actions of the EU institutions (eg Council, 
EU Human Rights Working Group (COHOM), EU Commission, European External Action Service (EEAS) 
and the European Parliament) will be considered as well as policies and actions of individual EU 
member states towards African IOs.  
B. Conceptual Framework: Coherence, consistency and effectiveness 
The ‘coherence’ and ‘consistency’ of human rights policies constitutes one of the biggest challenges 
for the EU.11 For the sake of this report coherent EU policymaking is defined as  
‘policymaking that seeks to achieve common, identifiable goals that are devised and 
implemented in an environment of collaboration, coordination and cooperative planning 
                                                          
7 According to Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement, ’respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are 
essential elements of the partnership’, while good governance is considered to be a ’fundamental element.’ Article 96, which 
gives teeth to the political dialogue, allows for the suspension of co-operation in the result of serious violations of the 
essential elements by the State Parties. 
8 For more details see http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/index_en.htm.  
9For more details see http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm.  
10For more details see http://ufmsecretariat.org/who-we-are/.  
11 This chapter is based on Grażyna Baranowska, Anna-Luise Chané, David D’Hollander, Agata Hauser, Jakub Jaraczewski, 
Zdzisław Kędzia, Mariusz Lewicki and Anna Połczyńska ‘Report on the analysis and critical assessment of EU engagement in 
UN bodies’, FRAME Deliverable 5.1, 2014, ch I.B.1. 
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among and within the EU Institutions, among the EU Institutions and Member States, as well 
as among EU Member States.’12 
Whether the concept of ‘consistency’ overlaps with ‘coherence’ or whether it is reduced to a 
temporal, geographical or personal dimension and thus narrower, is subject to debate. While relevant 
scholarship commonly uses the term ‘coherence’,13 EU treaty law – and consequently EU linguistic 
usage more generally – refers to ‘consistency’.14 The present report will follow the EU approach and 
employ a broad and overlapping understanding of ‘coherence’ and ‘consistency’, encompassing the 
above definition as well as the element of uniform action over time and across comparable situations.  
The coherence and consistency of EU human rights policies in its cooperation with African 
intergovernmental organisations can be measured across three different dimensions:15 
 Internal-external consistency: This level captures the degree to which the EU applies 
internally what it promotes externally. It is one of the most frequently voiced criticisms of 
third countries that the EU ‘does not practice what it preaches’. Common examples of 
perceived weaknesses in the EU’s own human rights record include the EU’s treatment of 
Roma people, the way it addresses racism and xenophobia within its borders, its lack of 
protection of and respect for economic and social rights – particularly during the economic 
crisis.16 Addressees of the Union’s internal human rights dimension are not only the EU 
institutions but also the individual Member States, who act as ‘ambassadors of EU human 
rights values’.17 
 External-external consistency: This dimension refers to the degree of uniformity in which the 
EU promotes human rights externally, both with regard to individual human rights issues and 
with regard to individual third country partners. It has for example been criticised that the EU 
places a stronger focus on the promotion of civil and political rights, to the detriment of 
economic, social and cultural rights.18  
                                                          
12 ‘Coherence (and consistency)’ FRAME Internal Fact Sheet, 2014, 1; see also Tamara Lewis, Wolfgang Benedek and Anna 
Müller-Funk, ‘Report on coherence of human rights policymaking in EU Institutions and other EU agencies and bodies’, 
FRAME Deliverable 8.1, 2014, <www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/materiale/reports/06-Deliverable-8.1.pdf>. 
13Cf Pascal Gauttier, ‘Horizontal coherence and the external competences of the European Union’ (2004) 10 European Law 
Journal 23; Carmen Gebhard, ‘Coherence’ in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds) International relations and the 
European Union (Oxford University Press 2011) 101; Christophe Hillion, ‘Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the 
external relations of the European Union’ in Marise Cremona (ed) Developments in EU external relations law (Oxford 
University Press 2008) 10; Clara Portela and KoljaRaube, ‘The EU Polity and Foreign Policy Coherence’ (2012) 8 Journal of 
Contemporary European Research 3; Leonhard den Hertog and Simon Stroß ‘Coherence in EU External Relations: Concepts 
and Legal Rooting of an Ambiguous Term’ (2013) 18 European Foreign Affairs Review 373; Anne-Claire Marangoni and 
KoljaRaube, ‘Virtue or Vice? The Coherence of the EU's External Policies’ (2014) 36 Journal of European Integration 473. 
14 See only Treaty on European Union, art 18(4): ‘[The HR/VP] shall ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action.’ 
15Based on keynote lecture by EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis, Interparliamentary 
Committee Meeting with EU National Parliaments, European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights, 25 September 
2013. 
16Grainne de Burca, ‘The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor’ (2011) 105 American Journal 
of International Law 649, 687. 
17 ibid. 
18Gjovalin Macaj and Joachim A. Koops, ‘Inconvenient multilateralism: The challenges of the EU as a player in the United 
Nations Human Rights Council’ in Jan Erik Wetzel (ed), The EU as a ‘Global Player’ in Human Rights? (Routledge 2011) 75 et 
seq. 
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 Internal-internal consistency: This last level captures the degree to which all representatives 
of EU institutions and EU Member States convey a uniform message about a particular 
country-specific or thematic human rights issue in the entirety of EU external action. The 
added value of the Union’s ‘multiple voices’ has frequently been pointed out. However, it is 
important that all actors ‘sing from the same song sheet’.19 
Inconsistency can arise particularly if the following factors apply: ‘[1] Structures are ill-designed, 
leading to a lack of coordination in policy design or policy implementation; [2] Frameworks have 
competing visions or overlapping responsibilities; [3] Interests diverge or conflict among policy 
goals’.20 
Lack of coherence and consistency leads to a loss of credibility as a human rights actor, and thus 
considerably reduces the impact of EU cooperation with African intergovernmental organisations. It 
is one of the most common and persistent criticisms that the EU faces. In the past years numerous 
policy initiatives have addressed this issue but provided only partial remedies.21 This report will 
therefore aim to identify and analyse instances and patterns of incoherence and inconsistency. It will 
conclude with recommendations on how these issues could be successfully addressed. 
The concept of ‘effectiveness’ refers to the ‘effects or impacts of a policy’.22 It is a multidimensional 
concept that can be conceptualised along several dimensions including  
 goal attainment/problem solvingeffectiveness, which refers to the degree to which specific 
policy goals are achieved; 
 process effectiveness, which refers to the degree to which the policies are adopted; 
 behavioural effectiveness, which focuses on the degree to which policies generated 
differences in behaviour and practices of key-actors; 
 constitutive effectiveness, which refers to the acceptance of policies by a large group of 
stakeholders.23 
Within the scope of this report the term will be used in the sense of goal attainment effectiveness, 
addressing whether or not the EU achieves to successfully promote its human rights policies and 
values in its cooperation with African regional organisations.  
                                                          
19Lambrinidis (n 15). 
20 FRAME (n 12) 2. 
21 For example the closer cooperation between COHOM and FREMP, the appointment of the EU Special Representative for 
Human Rights, but also the institutional reforms of the Lisbon Treaty in general. For more detail see the forthcoming reports 
of FRAME Work Package 8: ‘Coherence among EU Institutions and Member States’. 
22 ‘Effectiveness’, FRAME Internal Fact Sheet, 2014, 1. 
23 ibid; see for more detail the wealth of academic scholarship on the definition and measurement of effectiveness, e.g. Anna 
Tikina and John Innes, ‘A framework for assessing the effectiveness of forest certification’ (2008) 38 Canadian Journal of 
Forest Resources 1357; Oran R. Young, ‘The effectiveness of international governance systems’ in Oran R. Young (ed), 
International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (Cornell University Press 1994) 140. 
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C. Methodology 
The research for this report is based on the analysis of primary and secondary sources.  
Primary sources analysed for this report include official documents from the EU, the AU and other 
African IOs.  
EU documents were collected using the Official Journal of the EU,24 the EUR-Lex database,25 the public 
register of the Council of the European Union26 and the conclusions database on the website of the 
European Council.27 The methods of analysis range from keyword searches to textual and legal 
analyses, depending on the type of document and the research context. Documentation on the Africa 
– EU Partnership was collected on the website of the Partnership.28 Documents of AU and RECs were 
collected on the websites of the respective organisations. It should be noted that the AU and African 
RECs do not maintain comprehensive databases similar to those of the EU and the UN. 
Secondary sources used for this report include published academic articles and books, working papers 
and policy reports. They were collected through surveys in various databases and library catalogues. 
Interviews were conducted in person or by phone withhigh-level AU officials to clarify facts and to get 
their impression of the partnership. 
D. Structure 
Following this introductory chapter, this report provides a brief overview of the place of human rights 
and multilateralism in the EU (chapter II). Thereafter the relevant normative and institutional 
framework of the AU and other African IOs is mapped followed by an overview of the major EU human 
rights stakeholders in relation to Africa (chapter III). Chapter IV deals with the substantive goals and 
objectives of the EUs human rights policy in relation to Africa and includes analysis of the EUs own 
policies, and joint agreements, strategies and action plans including the Cotonou Agreement and the 
Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Chapter V considers the tools and methods used by the EU with a focus on 
the human rights dialogue with the AU. Chapter VI considers the EUs financial contribution to the AU 
and other African IOs in relation to human rights. Chapter VII sets out two case studies, one on food 
security and the other on human rights defenders. The final chapter presents the conclusions of the 
research. 
  
                                                          
24 See <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/oj/direct-access.html>. 
25See <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/>. 
26See <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/content/int?lang=EN&typ=SMPL>. 
27See <http://www.european-council.europa.eu/council-meetings/conclusions>. 
28See <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org>. 
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II. The place of human rights and multilateralism in the EU 
This section tackles the place of human rights and multilateralism in EU external policy. It presents the 
relevant Treaty provisions, EU strategic documents and other acts related to human rights. The aim of 
this section is to analyse the EU’s human rights priorities and their consistency throughout the relevant 
documents.  
A. European Union Treaties 
1. General principles of EU external action 
The Lisbon Treaty has significantly strengthened the place of human rights in the EU, not only 
internally (the binding force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), but also externally, by putting 
human rights in a central place amongst the principles of EU external action.29 Article 3 (5) TEU states 
that ‘in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests 
and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable 
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, 
eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well 
as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter’(emphasis added). Moreover, Article 21 TEU marks a general 
commitment of the EU to universal and indivisible human rights in EU external relations.30 However, 
it does not set out any specific priorities or objectives in this field. Therefore, according to Article 22 
(1) TEU, the European Council is tasked with the identification of the EU’s strategic interests and 
objectives on the basis of the general principles and objectives set out in Article 21.  
2. Principles in the matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
The specific principles of the CFSP are set out in Article 24 (2) and (3) TEU, but human rights are not 
mentioned in these provisions. However, according to Article 23 TEU, all EU’s actions in the field of 
CFSP are to be guided by principles and objectives set out in Article 21 TEU, mentioned above.  
                                                          
29 For a comparison of the internal/external provisions related to human rights cf Grainne de Búrca, ‘The Road Not Taken: 
The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor’ (2011) 105 American International Law Journal 682-685. 
30 ‘the Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, 
development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality 
and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (emphasis added)’. Article 21 
(2) TEU enumerates the general aims of the Union’s cooperation in the fields of international relations. According to this 
provision, the Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation 
in all fields of international relations, in order to, inter alia, ‘safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, 
independence and integrity (21 (2)(a) TEU), consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights (emphasis 
added) and the principles of international law’ (21 (2)(b) TEU) and ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen 
international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of 
the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders’ (21 (2)(c) TEU).  
According to art 21 (3) of the TEU the principles and objectives mentioned above, including human rights, must be respected 
and pursued by the EU in the development and implementation of: ‘the different areas of the Union's external action’covered 
by this Title  (General provisions on the Union’s external action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy)andby Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (The Union’s external action)the external 
aspects of its other policies.’  
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B. EU Guidelines on Human Rights 
The general commitment of the EU to the cause of human rights is specified in a series of Human 
Rights Guidelines adopted by the Council. To date, 11 thematic guidelines have been adopted.31They 
can be seen as a list of the EU’s top priorities in the field of human rights. The operational guidelines 
provide for specific actions to be taken by the EU in relation to the issue in question. These actions 
include political dialogue, démarches, monitoring and reporting.  
C. EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy32 
In 2012 the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy.33 These two documents ‘set out the EU's vision for its global human 
rights policy in the years ahead and establish a detailed list of actions that the EU will implement in 
order to promote these goals in practice’34 and therefore are essential for establishing the place of 
human rights in the EU’s external relations.35 Among others document states that the EU will work in 
partnership with regional and other organisations such as the African Union with a view to 
encouraging the consolidation of regional human rights mechanisms.  
The EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy sets out principles and defines the EU’s 
objectives and priorities in the field of human rights.The Strategic Framework states that ‘[t]he 
European Union is founded on a shared determination to promote peace and stability and to build a 
world founded on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. These principles underpin 
all aspects of the internal and external policies of the European Union’. The document also reaffirms 
the commitment to the promotion and protection of all human rights (civil and political, or economic, 
social and cultural).36 
The idea of human rights permeating all areas of the EU’s actions was further specified in the context 
of external relations by the Strategic Framework, which states that the EU will promote human rights 
in all areas of its external actions (including trade, investment, technology, internet, energy etc.) and 
will place human rights at the centre of its relations with all third countries, including its strategic 
partners. 
The Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy was adopted for the purpose of implementing the 
Strategic Framework. It builds on ‘the existing body of EU policy on human rights and democracy in 
                                                          
31 See discussion below.  
32 For an extensive analysis of priorities identified by the Strategic Framework/Action Plan, see: Cristina Churruca Muguruza, 
Felipe Gómez Isa, Daniel García San José, Pablo Antonio Fernández Sánchez, Carmen Márquez Carrasco, Ester Muñoz Nogal, 
MaríaNagore Casas and Alexandra Timmer, ‘Report mapping legal and policy instruments of the EU for human rights and 
democracy support’, FRAME Deliverable 12.1, < http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/materiale/reports/05-Deliverable-
12.1.pdf>.  
33 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, Doc No 
11855/12, 25 June 2012.  
34 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2012 (Thematic Reports), Doc No 9431/13, 13 May 
2013, 9. 
35 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2013, Doc No 11107/14, 23 June 2014, 13. 
36 In this regard, the Strategic Framework specifically refers to the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action –Towards a More Effective Approach, 12 December 
2011, COM(2011) 886 final, available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0886:FIN:EN:PDF>.  
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external action, notably EU guidelines, toolkits and other agreed positions and the various financial 
instruments, in particular the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights’.37 
D. Multilateralism38 
Having itself been called the ‘world’s most successful case of multilateralism’,39 the EU has embraced 
the concept of multilateralism from the very beginning.40 Nevertheless, it was only in 2003, that 
‘effective multilateralism’ was for the first time recognized as one of the fundamental principles of EU 
external action. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) recognized that ‘[i]n a world of global 
threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperityincreasingly depend on an 
effective multilateral system’ and it committed the EU to the ‘development of a strongerinternational 
society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’.41 It also 
explicitly recognized the ‘important contribution’ of the AU ‘to a more orderly world’.42 The 2008 
Report on the implementation of the ESS not only reaffirmed the Union’s commitment to effective 
multilateralism in its external action but also expressed the leadership ambitions of the EU, stating 
that ‘Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order’.43 
It was through the Treaty of Lisbon that this policy commitment was enshrined in EU primary law and 
thus considerably strengthened. Article 21 (1) TEU provides that the EU is obliged to pursue 
multilateral solutions in its relations with the wider world. In particular it is to ‘develop relations and 
build partnerships with […] international, regional or global organisations’, as long as they share 
certain principles, including human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It shall ‘promote an 
international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’ (Article 
21 (2) (h) TEU). 
Despite the widespread use of the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ throughout EU policy 
documents, its exact scope and content have remained vague and attracted considerable scholarly 
attention.44 In general the EU appears to pursue a three-fold interest through its engagement with 
other multilateral actors: 
1. Ensure that multilateral targets and instruments have the impact they deserve; 
2. Achieve greater efficiency and impact through cooperation; 
3. Promote EU values and interests effectively.45 
                                                          
37Unlike the Strategic Framework, the Action Plan has a deadline: it covers the period until 31 December 2014. 
38This section is based on the more detailed analysis in FRAME, ‘Report on the analysis and critical assessment of EU 
engagement in UN bodies’, Deliverable 5.1, November 2014, ch II.A.  
39Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 2. 
40Jan Wouters, Sijbren de Jong and Philip De Man, ‘The EU’s Commitment to Effective Multilateralism in the Field of Security: 
Theory and Practice’ (2010) 29 Yearbook of European Law 164, 170. 
41European Council, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003. 
42ibid. 
43European Council ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing 
World’, Doc No S407/08, 11 December 2008. 
44See FRAME, ‘Report on the analysis and critical assessment of EU engagement in UN bodies’, Deliverable 5.1, November 
2014, footnote 61 for references. 
45Based on Commission, ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism’ (Communication) 
COM(2003) 526 final. 
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This approach is reflected for example in the 2012 EU Strategic Framework and the Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy. The Strategic Framework provides that the Union ‘will work in 
partnership with regional and other organisations such as the African Union […] with aview to 
encouraging theconsolidation of regional human rights mechanisms’.46 In the same vein the Action 
Plan commits the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Member States to 
‘intensifydialogue with other regional organisations and support and engage withemerging regional 
organisations and mechanisms for the promotion ofuniversal human rights standards’.47 More 
specifically the Action Plan also contains obligations for the EU institutions and Member States to 
promote the ratification and implementation of regional human rights instruments (action no 4 (a)) 
and to ‘promote improved access by human rights defenders to the UN andregional human rights 
protection mechanisms, and address the issue ofreprisals against defenders engaging with those 
mechanisms’ (action no 18 (b)).  
Furthermore, most EU Human Rights Guidelines contain references to regional multilateral 
organisations in line with the abovementioned goals. They commit the EU inter alia to raise certain 
human rights issues in the political dialogues with regional organisations,48 to contribute to the 
strengthening and implementation of existing regional safeguards on the respective human rights 
issues,49 to monitor and encourage regional multilateral organisations50 and to cooperate with them 
more generally.51 
  
                                                          
46Council of the European Union (n 33). 
47ibid, action no 36. 
48 EU Human Rights Guidelines on torture, children and armed conflict, LGBTI rights, violence against women, HRDs, freedom 
of Religion and children’s rights. 
49 EU Human Rights Guidelines on torture, death penalty, freedom of opinion and expression, violence against women, HRDs 
and children’s rights. 
50EU Human Rights Guidelines on death penalty. 
51 EU Human Rights Guidelines on freedom of religion and on compliance with IHL. 
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III. Human rights institutional framework of African international 
organsiations and the EU 
A. AU and other African international organisations 
Promotion and protection of human rights ‘in accordance with the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments’ is one of the objectives of the AU.52 The 
AU in 2002 replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which was the first regional inter-
governmental organisation in Africa, established in 1963. Promotion and protection of human rights 
are also set out as principles that member states should adhere to in the treaties establishing Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),53 East African Community (EAC),54 Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS),55 Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD)56 and Southern African Development Community (SADC).57 
The main regional human rights treaty is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter) adopted in 1981 which entered into force in 1986. All the 54 members of the AU have ratified 
the African Charter except South Sudan. The substantive provisions of the Charter are complemented 
by the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa which was adopted in 2003 and entered into force 
in 2005. The OAU/AU has adopted numerous other treaties setting out human rights norms such as 
the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Refugee 
Convention (1969)), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s 
Charter (1990)), the African Youth Charter (2006), the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance (2007) and the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced 
Persons (2009). The AU has also adopted other important normative instruments in the form of non-
binding declarations such as the Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2000) and 
the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004). The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government in 2001 adopted the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as the 
development agenda for the continent. 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have also adopted important normative instruments such as 
the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) and the SADC Social Charter (2003) 
and the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (2008). 
The main regional institutions for promotion and protection of human rights are the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Court) and the African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(African Children’s Committee).Other institutions with a human rights mandate include the African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a voluntary process which states can sign up to in order to be 
reviewed by an independent panel of African experts and adopt an action plan to improve governance. 
                                                          
52African Union Constitutive Act art 3(h). 
53Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 1993, art 6(e). 
54 East African Community Treaty, 1999, art 6(d), 7(2). 
55The Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, 1993, art 4(g). 
56 Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Autority on Development, 1996, art 6A(f). 
57Treaty of the Southern African Develoopment Community, 1992, art 4(c). 
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The African Commission, an 11-member expert body, was established in 1987 and has a mandate to 
promote human rights across the continent through providing guidance to states on implementing 
the African Charter and other regional human rights instruments. Under the African Charter states 
should regularly report to the Commission on the implementation of the Charter. After a public 
dialogue the Commission adopts concluding observations. The Commission also provides guidance in 
the form of resolutions, guidelines and general comments on provisions of the Charter and the 
Women’s Protocol. The Commisson also considers individual and inter-state complaints regarding 
alleged violations of the Charter. The African Children’s Committee has a similar mandate in relation 
to the African Children’s Charter. 
The African Court was established following the entry into force in 2004 of the Protocol to the African 
Charter Establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted in 1998. The African 
Court complements the protective mandate of the African Commission (consideration of petitions). 
Only 24 of the AU member states have ratified the Protocol.58 Individuals and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in seven member states can access the Court directly after exhaustion of local 
remedies since these states have made a declaration allowing direct access.59 Cases against other 
states which have ratified the Protocol must be referred to the Court by the Commission.60 
The Court which currently only has human rights jurisdiction will change with the entry into force of 
the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights which was adopted in 
2008 but has not yet received the 15 ratifications required to entry into force. This Protocol will 
establish a general affairs section and a human rights section of the new Court. In 2014 the AU 
Assembly adopted a Protocol establishing a third chamber with criminal jurisdiction of the new court.61 
When this new Protocol enters into force the Court will have jurisdiction to try individuals for 
international crimes as defined in the Protocol. 
The African Court is not the only supranational court with a human rights mandate on the African 
continent. The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice has an explicit mandate to hear human rights 
cases, while the East African Court of Justice has heard cases dealing with human rights under the 
obligation to respect the rule of law as provided in the EAC Treaty. SADC had a Tribunal with limited 
human rights jurisdiction. However, this court was dismantled following a judgment which outraged 
Zimbabwe.62 
The highest decision making body of the AU is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government which 
meets twice a year for the AU Summit. The Executive Council, made up of ministers of foreign affairs 
or other designated ministers, meets the day before the Assembly to consider issues referred to the 
Assembly and to ‘monitor the implementation of policies formulated by the Assembly’.63 The 
                                                          
58See <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/court-establishment/ratification/> 
59See art 34(6) of the Protocol. Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda and Tanzania have made this 
declaration. 
60Protocol establishing the Court art 5. 
61Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 2014. 
62 Michelo Hansungule ‘The Suspension of the SADC Tribunal’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 35(1) 2013, 135. 
63AU Constitutive Act (n 52) art 13(2). 
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Permanent Representatives’ Committee, composed of the ambassadors to the AU, prepares the work 
of the Executive Council.64 
The AU Commission is the Secretariat of the Union which is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The 
Commission is composed of a chairperson, a deputy chairperson and Commissioners in charge of the 
following thematic areas:65 
 Political Affairs 
 Social Affairs 
 Trade and Industry 
 Economic Affairs 
 Peace and Security 
 Infrastructure and Energy 
 Human Resources, Science and Technology 
 Rural Economy and Agriculture  
Each Commissioner is in charge of a department on the thematic area. With regard to human rights 
the lead department is the Department of Political Affairs, though the work of the African Children’s 
Committee falls under the umbrella of the Department of Social Affairs.66 
A Pan-African Parliament (PAP) has been established with its seat in Midrand, South Africa. The 
Parliament was established to ‘ensure the full participation of African peoples in the development and 
integration of the continent’. For now PAP is indirectly elected and serves only in an advisory capacity. 
Another body created to ensure wide participation in the setting of the agenda of the continental 
organisation is the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) which is composed of CSOs from 
across the continent and the diaspora. 
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was not included among the AU organs in the Constitutive Act 
but established by the AU through the Protocol on the PSC adopted in 2002. The PSC is composed of 
15 AU member states on a rotational basis and meets regularly to assess the peace and security 
situation across the continent. Its powers include the deployment of peace support missions and the 
imposition of sanctions as a result of unconstitutional change of government in an AU member state. 
The AU has established the African Governance Architecture (AGA) to better coordinate the efforts 
of various organs in implementing the instruments adopted by the AU and RECs in relation to human 
rights, governance and democracy.67 The AGA is an evolving mechanism composed of three cardinal 
pillars: normative vision, institutions and processes of interactions amongst AU bodies with human 
                                                          
64AU Constitutive Act (n 52) art 21. 
65See <http://www.au.int/en/commission>. 
66The Secretariat of the Committee is based in this department while the Secretariat of the African Commission is located in 
Banjul, The Gambia, and the African Court in Arusha, Tanzania. 
67George Mukundi Wachira, ‘Consolidating the African Governance Architecture’, SAIIA Policy Briefing 96, June 2014. 
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rights, democracy and governance mandates. However, Tissiand Aggad-Clerx has observed that 
despite the numerous promises which came with its establishment, the AGA has been riddled with 
numerous challenges which have constrained its effective operationlisation.68 The membership of the 
AGA framework reflects a wide spectrum of actors with a blend of approaches and competencies to 
advance continental human rights and governance agende. Yet, within the AGA the workflows and 
relationships among these actors are still far from clrear.69 Further, it is confronted with a shortage of 
human resource capacity at the AU Commission, an uneven commitment by African leaders and less 
fiancial and political support from the donors including the EU.70 
B. Major EU human rights stakeholders involved directly or indirectly in 
cooperation with the AU and other African IOs 
The following section will map the major stakeholders in the EU which are involved directly or 
indirectly in theory or practice in the cooperation with the AU and other African IOs.71 
The European Council functions as the primary agenda setter and strategic body of the EU. According 
to Article 26(1) TEU it shall ‘identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the objectives […] and 
define general guidelines’, and thus set the general political directions and priorities of EU foreign 
policy. So far, the European Council has only rarely addressed human rights issues,72 however the 
Council concludes on ongoing crises in African states.73 
The Council of the European Union is mandated with policy-making, coordinating and 
legislativefunctions.74 It meets in 10 different formations, depending on the policy area at hand. The 
Foreign Affairs Council ‘shall elaborate the Union’s external action on the basis of strategic guidelines 
laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union’s action is consistent’.75 It is 
instrumental for the adoption of decisions concerning the EU’s human rights priorities and strategies 
in its cooperation with the AU.76 Most notably, on 25 June 2012 the Foreign Affairs Council adopted 
the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, which provided 
strategic guidance for the Union’s engagement with regional organizations, explicitly referring to the 
AU.77 Furthermore, since 2008, the Foreign Affairs Council has adopted a set of eleven Human Rights 
Guidelines, which stipulate the Union’s priorities and strategies on a variety of human rights issues. 
The majority of these Guidelines contain explicit guidelines for EU cooperation with regional 
                                                          
68Nicola Tissi and Fatten Aggad-Clerx,  ‘The road ahead for the African Governance Architecture: An overview of current 
challenges and possible solutions’ (2014) available at <http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/the-road-ahead-for-the-
african-governance-architecture-an-overview-of-current-challenges-and-possible-solutions>.  
69 Tissi and Aggad-Clerx (n 68) 7. 
70 Tissi and Aggad-Clerx (n 68) 10. 
71 For more detailed information on the various EU actors discussed in this chapter see FRAME, ‘Report on the analysis and 
critical assessment of EU engagement in UN bodies’, Deliverable 5.1, November 2014, ch III.B. 
72 FRAME, ‘Report on the analysis and critical assessment of EU engagement in UN bodies’, Deliverable 5.1, November 2014, 
ch III.B.1. 
73 For example on 21 March 2014 the European Council presented Delegations with its Conclusions inter alia on EU-Africa 
relations. See: Conclusions of 21st March paras. 35-37. 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141749.pdf>. accessed 15.06.2015 
74 TEU art 16(1). 
75 TEU art 16(6). 
76 See also infra, ch IV.A. 
77 Council of the European Union (n 32). 
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organizations in general and with the AU in particular.78 The Foreign Affairs Council often discusses 
African issues including terrorism79, elections80 and epidemics.81 The Council is supported by a 
Secretariat, the Permanent Representatives Committee (‘COREPER’), the Political and Security 
Committee (‘PSC’) and more than 150 specialised committees and working parties. 
COREPER is tasked with ‘preparing the work of the Council’, ‘carrying out the tasks assigned to it by 
the latter’82 and ‘ensur[ing] consistency of the European Union’s policies and actions’.83 In its COREPER 
II formation (comprising the Permanent Representatives of the EU Member States) it is responsible 
for examining all draft proposals before placing them on the agenda of the Council. 
The Political and Security Committee is a permanent Council committee whose mandate includes 
monitoring the international situation within the area of theCFSP, contributing to policy making by 
delivering opinions to the Foreign Affairs Council, and monitoring the implementation of agreed 
policies.84 It plays an important role in the policy development process of the EU as it discusses and 
endorses at ambassadorial level proposals originating from the working groups before forwarding 
them to the COREPER.  
The Council Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM) is a key actor in defining the EU’s human rights 
policy. It drafts EU strategic human rights documents and ensures outreach to internal and external 
stakeholders during the preparatory stages. As such it was for example responsible for drafting the EU 
Strategic Framework and Action Plan and most of the Union’s human rights guidelines.85In addition to 
thematic working parties the Council also has geographic working parties. The CouncilAfricaWorking 
Party (COAFR) is responsible for the management of EU external policy towards sub-Saharan Africa, 
including its 46 countries, the AU and other sub-regional organizations. 
The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission 
(HR/VP) conducts and contributes to the development of the Union’s CFSP.86 She chairs the Foreign 
Affairs Council,87 represents the Union externally for matters relating to the CFSP,88 and organises the 
coordination of EU Member States’ positions in international organisations and conferences.89 The 
HR/VP meets with the representatives of African states and delivers statements relating to African 
                                                          
78 See infra, ch IV.A. 
79 Council conclusions on the Boko Haram threat, 09/02/2015 Press release 44/15, Foreign affairs & international relations, 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-boko-haram-threat/>. 
accessed 15.06.2015. 
80 Council conclusions on elections in Nigeria, 09/02/2015 Press release 46/15, Foreign affairs & international relations,
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-elections-nigeria/>. 
accessed 15.06.2015. 
81 Council conclusions on Ebola, 16/03/2015 Press release 121/15 Foreign affairs & international relations 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/16-council-conclusions-ebola/>. accessed 15.06.2015 
82 TFEU art 240(1). 
83 Council Decision 2009/937/EU of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure [2009] OJ L325/35, art 19(1). 
84 TEU art 38. 
85 Note for example that the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) were update 
by the Council Working Party on Public International Law (COJUR).  
86 TEU art 18(2). 
87 TEU art 18(3), 27(1). 
88 TEU art 15(6), 27(2). 
89 TEU art 34(1). 
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matters. For example the HR/VP gave statements on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire90 and on arbitrary 
arrests in Sudan.91 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) is responsible for supporting the HR/VP in fulfilling her 
mandate,92 and for assisting ‘the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, 
and the Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations’.93 
At headquarters level, the Directorate for Human Rights and Democracy is tasked with mainstreaming 
human rights in the work of the EEAS. In addition, the Directorates for Africa and for North Africa, 
Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, Iran & Iraq are responsible for the EU’s relations with the African 
continent. On the ground it is the EU Delegation to the African Unioncreated in December 2007, 
which represents the Union vis-à-vis the AU.94Located in Addis Ababa, the Delegation deals with 
CFSP/CSDP and Union policy areas in the context of the Africa-EU strategic partnership mainly through 
dialogue on political issues of mutual concern and longer term cooperation and institution building.95 
The Delegation coordinates several projects of pan-African nature among which primarily the African 
Union Support Programme (AUSP).96 
The EU Special Representative for Human Rights (EUSR) has been appointed on 25 July 2012 in order 
to contribute to enhancing the visibility and effectiveness of the Union’s human rights policy.97His 
tasks include improving the coherence and mainstreaming of human rights in EU external action, as 
well as ‘enhanc[ing] dialogue with governments in third countries and international and regional 
organisations on human rights’.98 In line with his mandate, he has repeatedly met with AU 
representatives or participated in AU events.99 The Council has appointed two other EUSR dealing with 
                                                          
90 Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on Côte d'Ivoire of 3 March 2011, A 089/11 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119597.pdf>. 
91 Statement by the spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on Arbitrary Arrests in Sudan of 21 May 2011, 
A 195/11 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122139.pdf>. accessed 
15.06.2015. 
92 TEU art 27(3); Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European 
External Action Service [2010] OJ L201/30, art 2(1). 
93 ibid art 2(2). 
94 See also TEU art 221(1) which provides that ‘Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall 
represent the Union’. 
95 Delegation of the European Union to the African Union, The Role of the EU Delegation, 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african_union/about_us/delegation_role/index_en.htm>. accessed 15.06.2015 
96 Discussed in detail below in the section on financing. 
97 Council Decision 2012/440/CFSP of 25 July 2012 appointing the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights 
[2012] OJ L200/21; his mandate has been most recently renewed through Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/260 of 17 February 
2015 extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights [2015] OJ L43/29. For more 
information on the EUSR see also DominikTolksdorf, ‘EU Special Representatives: An Intergovernmental Tool in the Post-
Lisbon Foreign Policy System?’ (2013) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review 471; Jan Wouters, Laura Beke, Anna-LuiseChané, 
David D’Hollander and Kolja Raube, ‘A comparative study of the EU and US approaches to human rights in external relations’ 
(n 20) 65 et seq. 
98 Council Decision 2012/440/CFSP (n 93) art 3(c). 
99 See for example the meeting of the EUSR with the Commissioner for Political Affairs of the African Union Commission in 
December 2014, ‘African Union and European Union to promote the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’, 
3 December 2014, 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20141203_au_eu_bussiness_human_r
ights_en.htm>. accessed 15.06.2015. 
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African issues: the EUSR for the Horn of Africa100 and the EUSR for the Sahel101 whose mandates are 
based on active contribution to ‘regional and international efforts to achieve lasting peace, security 
and development’102 in given regions. From 2007 to 2014 the EU had a SR for the AU who currently 
remains head of the EU Delegation to the AU. His mandate was based on the EU's ‘comprehensive 
policy objectives in support of African efforts to build a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future 
as set out in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy’.103 
As the Union’s executive body, the European Commission ensures and oversees the application of EU 
primary and secondary law.104 It actively engages in mainstreaming human rights across all policy 
areas105 and represents the Union externally in all areas that do not fall under the CFSP.106The AU 
Commission and the EC meet in College-to-College sessions.  
The European Parliament is considered to play ‘a leading role in the promotion of human rights, in 
particular through its resolutions’.107 As the Council has stated in the Strategic Framework, the 
European Parliament’s ‘democratic mandate gives it particular authority and expertise in the field of 
human rights’. It has repeatedly adopted resolutions dealing with the human rights situation in 
Africa108 sometimes referring to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.109In addition, the 
Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) has on several occasions discussed issues of 
relevance for the AU. It conducted studies,110 workshops111 and study visits. Members of DROI visited 
AU Commission premises in Addis Ababa on 15-17 July 2013. 
Additionally the EU Member States often create specialized cells within the structure of their 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs for cooperation with African states and IOs.112 
  
                                                          
100 Council Decision CFSP 2015/440 of 16 March 2015 extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative 
for the Horn of Africa.  
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105 For a detailed analysis of the human rights policy of the various Commission DGs, see Frame Report D4.2, ‘Report global 
human rights protection governance system’ (forthcoming July 2015). 
106 TEU art 17(1). 
107 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, Doc No 
11855/12, 25 June 2012, 9. 
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Department briefing. 
111 For example: Workshop of 20 June 2011 on the role of women in the democratization process in North Africa and the 
Middle East (FEMM, AFET, DEVE, DROI).  
112 For example: Department of Africa and the Middle East of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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IV. Substantive goals and objectives 
A. EU human rights policy 
This section assesses the aims and objectives of the EU’s human rights policy in relation to Africa and 
also gives a brief overview of the EU’s strategy development process. 
In 2005 the European Commission adopted the EU Strategy for Africa. This Strategy considers 
‘international law and human rights, equality and mutual accountability’ as the ‘core principles’ upon 
which its partnership with Africa is predicated.113 
The Strategy operates on the basis of ownership and responsibility, including working through African 
institutions. According to the EU Strategy for Africa  
the primary responsibility for building democracy lies in the hands of Africa’s people and of its ruling class 
[…] democracy cannot be created or imposed by […] external actors […] the appropriate role of external 
actors is therefore instead to support and encourage domestic efforts to build, strengthen and sustain 
democratic norms, procedures and institutions.114 
The Strategy affirms that the partnership between the EU and Africa must be based on respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.115 It lists the reinforcement of human rights and democracy 
as one of the areas of action, while putting particular emphasis on children’s and women’s rights and 
gender equality.116  
Similarly, the EU’s 2012 Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 
includes the AU as one of those regional organisations with which the EU seeks to ‘work in partnership’ 
and ‘intensify dialogue […] for the promotion ofuniversal human rights standards’.117 
Apart from this general commitment to human rights promotion and protection, the EU has adopted 
additional policy documents which specify its concrete goals and objectives with regard to its human 
rights cooperation with the AU. Among these are the EU’s Human Rights Guidelines as well as a 
number of agreements, strategies and Action Plans adopted by the EU or jointly by the EU and the AU. 
1. EU Human Rights Guidelines118 
Since 2008, the EU has adopted a set of eleven Guidelines, addressing children’s rights (2008) and 
children in armed conflict (2008), human rights defenders (2008), violence against women and girls 
and discrimination against them (2008), human rights dialogues (2009), compliance with international 
                                                          
113 See ‘EU Strategy for Africa’, available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/african_caribbean_pacific_states/r12540_en.htm. 
114 See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social 
Committee, EU Strategy for Africa – Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s development, COM(2005) 489 final, 
12 October 2005, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0489.  
115 ibid, 19. 
116 ibid, 25. 
117Council of the European Union, ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, Doc No 
11855/12, 25 June 2012. 
118 This section corresponds to Filip Balcerzak, Anna-Luise Chané, Chiara Marinelli, Amilcar Romero, Elizabeth Salmón, ‘Report 
on the EU’s engagement with regional multilateral organisations – Case study: Inter-American perspective’, FRAME 
Deliverable 5.6, forthcoming, ch IV. 
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humanitarian law (2009), torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
(2012), the issue of the death penalty (2013), freedom of religion or belief (2013), Lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) rights (2013) and most recently freedom of expression 
online and offline (2014). The majority of these guidelines contain explicit priorities for EU cooperation 
with regional organisations in general or with the AU in particular.  
This engagement takes a number of forms. Most prominent is the commitment of the EU to raise 
particular human rights issues in the political dialogues with regional organisations.119 The EU 
Guidelines on Torture, for example, provide that the ‘human rights component of the political 
dialogue between the EUand […] regional organisations shall include the issue of torture and other ill-
treatment’. Similar provisions can be found in the EU Human Rights Guidelines on children’s rights, 
children and armed conflict, LGBTI rights, violence against women, human rights defenders (HRDs) 
and freedom of religion or belief. 
Secondly, most guidelines commit the EU to contribute to the strengthening and implementation of 
existing regional safeguards on the abovementioned human rights issues, and to promote the creation 
of those safeguards wherever they do not yet exist. Respective provisions can be found in the EU 
Human Rights Guidelines on torture, death penalty, freedom of opinion and expression, violence 
against women, HRDs and children’s rights.120 A number of human rights guidelines explicitly refer to 
AU instruments and institutions. The Guidelines on Freedom of Expression for example commit the 
EU to ‘encourage partner countries to ratify and implement relevant […] regional human rights 
instruments’ and to cooperate closely with special rapporteurs from regional organisations, referring 
explicitly to Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and to the Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information of the African Commission. The EU 
Guidelines on Torture commit the EU to ‘urge third countries to […] accede to […] relevant regional 
instruments such as the Robben Island Guidelines on the prevention and prohibition of torture in 
Africa’. 
The guidelines on death penalty equally single out the AU as a partner organisation, stating that the 
‘EU monitors closely and encourages measures and initiatives taken by otherregional organisations 
inter alia the African Union […], who work towards the abolition of the death penalty’. Regional 
organisations are also considered as a source of information in the guidelines on LGBTI rights and on 
                                                          
119 Guidelines to EU Policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (2012); EU Guidelines for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child (2008); EU Guidelines on 
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children’s rights. Finally, guidelines call upon the EU to cooperate with regional organisations to 
promote certain human rights issues, for example, through joint statements.121 
The strategy development process of EU external human rights activity spans four consecutive 
stages.122 In a first step, COHOM is responsible for drafting the policy document and gathering internal 
and external input. Internally, COHOM cooperates inter alia with other Council working parties, the 
EEAS, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Special Representative for Human 
Rights and with EU delegations. Externally, COHOM reaches out to other international organisations, 
HRDs and civil society. The draft proposal is then sent to the PSC for discussion and endorsement at 
ambassadorial level. Subsequently the draft proposal is forwarded to the Permanent Representatives 
Committee (COREPER II) for inclusion in the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), by which it is finally 
adopted. 
B. Agreements, strategies and action plans 
1. Agreements 
The establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) through the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Rome in 1958 marked the beginning of collective European development policy towards 
Africa. The Yaoundé Convention was signed in 1963, shortly after the establishment of the OAU,123by 
the Community’s six founding members and 18 newly independent sub-Saharan African states.The 
African states were all former colonies or mandate territories of the EEC member states. There was 
not much engagement of the OAU in the negotiations over Yaoundé I or its successor treaty Yaoundé 
II signed in 1969. This changed with the negotiations over what became the Lomé Convention which 
was negotiated between the EC and the ACP states with significant participation of the OAU.124  The 
ACP which was created by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975 seeks to reduce poverty and enhance 
sustainable development within its member states. The Lomé Convention came into force in April 
1976 and was revised four times (Lomé II, 1981; Lomé III, 1985; Lomé IV, 1989, Lomé IV-bis, 1995).125 
In 2000 the Lomé Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement126which is the 
largest North-South partnership in the world.127 It was signed in 2000 in Cotonou, Benin, between the 
EU and members of the ACP group of states. With the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating 
                                                          
121 EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief (2013); EU Guidelines on promoting 
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<http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/guidelines/index_en.htm>. 
122 This paragraph is a brief summary of FRAME, ‘Report on the analysis and critical assessment of EU engagement in UN 
bodies’, Deliverable 5.1, November 2014, ch IV.B. 
123 Signed on 20 July 1963, it entered into force on 1 June 1964. The six founding members of the EEC were Belguim, France, 
Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and West Germany). On the other hand, the eighteen  African states parties to the 
Convention were Benin (then Dahomey), Burundi, Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), Central African Republic, Cameroon, 
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human rights in development cooperation: The case of the Lomé Convention (Kluwer Law International 2000). 
126Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and 
the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, [2000] OJ L317/3. 
127European Centre for Development Policy Management 'The EU and Africa – The policy context for development' (2010) 4. 
See also Europa 'Cotonou agreement' (November 2011)  
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/african_caribbean_pacific_states/r12101_en.htm>. 
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poverty, the Cotonou Agreement incorporates a political dimension through political dialogue and the 
promotion of human rights.128 
The Cotonou Agreement was revised in 2005 and in 2010 to recognise the process of regional and 
continental integration across the ACP.129 Presently all the 79 member states of the ACP except Cuba 
are signitories to the Cotnonou Agreement which is due for revision in 2015.130 The African Union, 
which has 48 of its members from the Sub-Saharan Africa as members of the ACP and signitories to 
the Cotonou Agreement,131 is now officially recognised as an actor of cooperation.132 In the new article 
30, cooperation is focused on developing and strengthening the capacity of regional institutions in 
order to increase effectiveness and efficiency of regional policies. In line with such changes, in 2005, 
the AU became eligible for ACP funding from the European Development Fund.Regular political 
dialogue between the EU and its member states and ACP member states is provided for in the Cotonou 
Agreement.133 
The prominent place human rights occupy, at least theoretically, is evident in article 9 of the 
CotonouAgreement which sets out the parties’ commitment to human rights and declares that 
Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, which underpin the ACP-EU 
Partnership, shall underpin the domestic and international policies of the Parties and constitue the 
essential elements of this Agreement. 
The legal obligation of state parties to take measures to promote ‘internatioanlly recognised core 
labour standards’ is set out under article 50. Specifically, states are obliged to enhance partnership 
though exchange of information on work regulation, the drafting of national labour laws, educational 
and awareness programmes and implementation of domestic legislations.134 
 Article 96 provides for a consultation procedure and appropriate measures to be adopted if a party 
considers that despite the regular political dialogue under article 8 a party has failed to fulfil an 
essential element. If no solution can be found ‘appropriate measures may be taken’.135   
2. Joint Africa-EU Strategy 
The first Africa-EU summit took place in Cairo in 2000 and culminated at the second summit in 2007 
in Lisbon into a reinforcement of the links between the two continents through the JointAfrica-EU 
Strategy (JAES) adopted as a framework for political dialogue between Africa and Europe, based on 
certain priority areas, including regional integration in Africa and human rights.136It is aimed at ‘“Win-
Win” outcomes for the mutual benefits of the parties involved. It is based on the principle of trust, 
equality and mutual respect. It aims at obliterating the age-long pattern of donor-recipient 
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relationship, to one founded on reciprocal obligations and responsibilities.’137 
JAES is an extension and expansion of the nature and scope of partnership between the AU and the 
EU provided for in the EU Strategy for Africa. For the first time in the history of interaction between 
Africa and Europe, a formal partnership framework placed both the AU and the EU on an equal footing 
and ensured equal participation and representation of the two continents.138  JAES operates on the 
basis that Africans would not be just the ‘”recipients” of pre-packaged assistance from the EU but 
would be sitting at the negotiation and decision-making table together with the EU.’139 
JAES provides for a common pathway to sustainable development for the two continents. Accordingly, 
the partners have agreed that ‘democratic governance and human rights are key for sustainable 
development and for cooperation between the partners, and are an integral part of both the EU and 
AU’s core values.’140 
The AU is an integral part of the JAES as evidenced by the inclusion of the President of the AU and the 
Chairperson of the African Union Commission as contributors to the Summit declarations as well as to 
the road maps. This is in line with the objective of the JAES to treat Africa as one continent. 
The objective of JAES is to provide an overarching framework for bilateral partnership between the 
EU and Africa, to be operationalised through eight thematic partnerships and consecutive action plans 
(APs):  
(i) peace and security;  
(ii) democratic governance and human rights;  
(iii) trade and regional integration;  
(iv) energy;  
(v) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs);  
(vi) migration, mobility and employment;  
(vii) science, information society and space;  
(viii) climate change  
The strategy seeks to bridge the existing donor-recipient gap between the two parties. First, the 
parties agreed on the need to consolidate and deal with Africa as one, as opposed to earlier 
disintegration of policy and institutional overlaps. This shortcoming has evidently strained the AU-EU 
relations. Against this backdrop, the parties, and especially the AU committed itself to facilitate the 
ongoing institutional transformation process. The second component is the regional integration or the 
‘Unity of Africa’, as a fundamental principle underlining JAES. It is, indeed, the first political framework 
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that acknowledges the need to strengthen regional and continental integration as well as promotes 
the AU’s ‘Pan-African’ integration agenda. Third, the strategy stresses the ambition to reinforce the 
AU-EU engagement through enhanced cooperation and strengthened political engagement at all 
levels, including the joint support for efficient multilateralism. Finally, it emphasised an obligation on 
parties to collaborate to ensure coherence and effectiveness of existing instruments, policies and 
agreements to achieve the objectives of the partnership. This element reiterates the conception that 
cooperation between the two regions will be premised on equal participation and representation.  
These strategic orientations which extend to, and reinforce the Africa-EU political dialogue and 
engagement are to be implemented through Action Plans (APs) resulting in for example working 
relations between the European and Pan-African Parliaments, broadening of the scope of the African 
Peace Facility (APF) and participation of CSOs in the inter-continental dialogue. JAES according to 
Meyn is ground breaking considering that it hinges on three essential values, namely equal 
partnership, ownership and joint accountability.141 However, issues such as negotiations on Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) illustrate the unequal relationship that exists between the two sides 
in practice.142 With some African sub-regional groupings refusing to become parties to EPAs, the EU 
has allegedly resorted to pressure African states  to sign interim EPA with the threat that it would 
‘reimpose import duties on major categories of’  exports from non-LDC African states.143 
3. Roadmap (2014-2017) 
The declaration adopted at the 4th Africa-EU summit in April 2014 in Brussels, reaffirmed the 
commitment to reinforce respect for human rights, good governance and rule of law.  Under the 
banner of ‘Investing in people, prosperity and peace’ priority areas were identified, namely: (i) 
contributing to human security, reducing fragility and foster political stability; (ii) ensure transparent, 
democratic and accountable governance (iii) promote human capital development; (iv) stimulate 
economic growth through poverty reduction; and (iv) addressing emerging issues such as resource 
management, environment and climate change.  
The theme of the summit underlined the leaders’ intent to shift the focus from donor-recipient 
relationship and conflict management to economic development and solid business cooperation.144 
This was evinced in the willingness to deepen economic partnership in areas of private-public 
development in order to provide a meaningful counterbalance to emerging economies such as China 
and India.  
Despite this apparent move away from security issues, the fact that peace and security was 
progressively the first of the items to be discussed reflects the primary objective of the partnership in 
terms of priorities. This is not surprising considering that economic development is preconditioned on 
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stability and most African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) would be gravely constrained without 
the Peace Facility .145 
4. Action plans 
First Action Plan (2008-2010) 
The first JAES action plan commenced on 9 December 2007 with a two-year time frame. Under this 
framework, development of infrastructure was an overarching priority. Democracy, governance and 
human rights were listed as three of the cross-cutting themes of special importance to the partnership.  
The plan led to the launching of the first Africa-EU Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human 
Rights (PDGHR) Action Plan. Under this initiative, cultural cooperation and sustainable development 
was also considered as a core EU-AU value.  Objectives included to (i) to facilitate discussion at global 
and international fora; (ii) support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; and 
the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); and (iii) increased collaboration in the sector of cultural 
goods.  
Furthermore, in light of the responsibility and political guidance of the existing AU-EU Ministerial 
Troika, and with inputs from sector-specific ministerial Troikas, the first AP sought to provide 
institutional architecture and implementation modalities to ensure the implementation of the 
aforementioned priorities. The Joint EU-AU Task Force was in due course established and mandated 
to ensure the evaluation of development achieved and provide feedbacks to their relevant regions.  
Second Action Plan (2011-2013) 
The 3rd Africa-EU Summit meeting in Tripoli in 2010 adopted the second AP (2011-2013). In addition 
to the eight themes operationlised under the previous AP, cross-cutting issues of coordination, 
institutional architecture and financing were included in this mechanism.  
The text covers in detail the following areas: (i) peace and security; (ii) democratic governance and 
human rights; (iii) regional economic integration, trade and infrastructure; (iv) MDGs; (v) climate 
change and environment; (vi) energy; (vii) migration, mobility and employment; and (viii) science, 
information society and space. In addition to reinforcing these thematic issues, the plan stressed the 
importance of a more dynamic private sector, and reiterated the bilateral commitment to collaborate 
with international allies to achieve growth in all sectors of engagement.  
The Africa-EU partnership on democratic governance and human rights as set out in the 2011-2014 
Action Plan had the following objectives:146 
 To strengthen the open and inclusive Africa-EU dialogue on democratic governance and human rights. 
This shall also contribute to enhancing the joint influence of Africa and the European Union in 
international fora and at global level in these fields.   
 To contribute to the establishment and strengthening of the African Governance Architecture with 
coordinated EU support   
                                                          
145ibid. 
146JAES Action Plan 2011-2013, Partnership on democratic governance and human rights. 
FRAME    Deliverable No. 5.4 
24 
 
 To strengthen the close cooperation between Africa and the EU in the area of cultural goods and other 
cultural activities    
 To strengthen synergies and linkages between human rights and democratic governance in its political, 
economic and social dimension and other areas of the Africa/EU partnership   
The Africa-EU ‘Platform for dialogue’ on governance and human rights was established in November 
2010, days before the third AU-EU summit. The Platform created an open space for key AU-EU 
stakeholders to engage in all-inclusive discussion towards addressing the overall aim of the PDGHR, 
specifically on poor governance and rule of law.147 However, the operationalisation of the platform 
has been fraught with several controversies ranging from lack of political support from both the AU 
and EU sides, leading to the double postponement of its sessions.148 
5. Sub-regional cooperation strategies 
In addition to the inclusion of the RECs within the framework of JAES, the EU also supportssub-regional 
initiatives not aligned to the RECs such as the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, 
Armed Robbery Against Ships and Illicit Activity in West and Central Africa adopted by the Summit of 
Gulf of Guinea Heads of State in 2013.149 
The EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel notes that the  
EU will need to promote and encourage actively African responsibility and ownership, particularly of the 
African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to demonstrate focus, 
urgency, pragmatism and political engagement, along with flexibility and a requirement to coordinate 
with other players, such as the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) …150 
The strategy is not the result of collaboration between the institution and it is noticeable that CEN-
SAD, which is the REC covering the whole Sahel area is not even mentioned in the Strategy.151 In 
contrast support for the CEN-SAD Secretariat is set out as one of the objectives of the EU support for 
the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative in 2011.152 
6. EU member state initiatives 
In addition to the EU-AU partnership and support, different members of the EU have different 
initiatives targeting the AU human rights and governance activities. For instance, Sweden, through 
SIDA, has a strategy for support for regional and sub-regional development cooperation in sub-
Saharan Africa.153 One of the objectives of this strategy is ‘supporting networks and regional 
institutions for exchange of knowledge and joint policy development in healthcare, education and 
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culture, and also in relation to democracy, human rights and gender equality.’154 Through this strategy 
Sweden supports the AU and its institutions such as NEPAD and other sub-regional bodies ‘to promote 
democracy and human rights.’ 155 
Denmark and Norway, through Danida and Norad, have not only been active in implementing the 
JAES, but have been also busy promoting Nordics priorities either through the EU or through 
framework arrangements with the AU and other pan - African institutions such as NEPAD.156 The UK, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands have equally developed pan-African programmes directed at 
engaging the AU and other pan-African bodies. According to DFID’s Africa Regional Programme 
Operational Plan 2011-2015, for example, the Government of the UK is committed to ‘strengthen 
governance, accountability and conflict prevention through improving election monitoring and 
feedback of citizens’ views on country governance to their policy makers across Africa.’ 157 
The multiplicities of the initiatives of EU member states targeting the African Union, though 
commendable, could be problematic. First, this is because of the lack of capacity to effectively 
implement these initiatives on the part of the AU Commission. Second, in the absence of an overall 
coordinating mechanism on the side of the EU member states, the chances for duplication of efforts, 
overlapping of initiatives, waste of scarce resources and minimum impact are high. For instance, the 
evaluation of the Danida pan-African programme reported lack of donor coordination and clear 
responsibilities among different actors.158 
C. Conclusions 
The joint EU-Africa strategic partnership put African IOs and in particular the AU at the centre of EU 
engagement with the region. JAES coexists with a number of other initiatives with similar aims, most 
importantly the Cotonou Agreement. JAES recognises accountability, equal partnership and 
ownership as the three core values. It further highlights the essence of regionalism in Africa which has 
evolved as a solution to overcome the setbacks of disintegration in a competitive market. JAES follows 
in the footsteps of the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa with the EU leading the way for the formulation of 
principles of the partnership but allowing African institutions taking the lead on implementation. 
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V. Tools/methods employed by the EU at the African IOs 
A. Introduction 
The two continents have employed different tools to enhance the quality of their interaction. Have 
these tools delivered on their goals of improving relationship and inter-continental understanding? 
This section is an attempt to assess the level of commitment to these tools; the quality of these tools; 
the institutional arrangements underpinning them and the inter-linkages between the different tools 
and the broader continental interests, goals and focus. This study intends to contribute by specifically 
evaluating the effectiveness of the cooperation in strengthening and promoting collaboration in the 
areas of democracy, rule of law and human rights. 
The effectiveness of the following AU-EU joint activities will be examined in this section: AU-EU Human 
Rights Dialogue (the Dialogue), Africa-EU Platform for Dialogue on Governance and Human Rights (the 
Platform), EU-Africa Summit (the Summit), EU-Africa High Level Policy Dialogue (the Policy Dialogue), 
Commission-to-Commission meetings (the College), EU member state initiatives and sub-regional 
political dialogues. 
B. Dialogue 
i. Human rights dialogue 
Human rights dialogues with third countries constitute one of the important pillars of EU external 
policy. So far, the dialogues are mostly between EU and third countries. The only exception to this is 
the EU-AU dialogue. The guidelines governing the initiation, operationalization and management of 
human rights dialogues are the EU guidelines on human rights dialogues with third countries (EU 
Guidelines). The EU Guidelines have several aims, namely to identify the role human rights 
instruments play in EU external policy and to ensure coherence, consistency and, where needed, 
flexibility and pragmatism across human rights dialogues. 
The human rights dialogues are supposed to facilitate the process of mainstreaming human rights and 
democratisation into all aspects of EU external engagement. The objectives of the dialogues are:159 
‘(a) Discussing questions of mutual interest and enhancing cooperation on human rights. 
(b) Registering the concern felt by the EU at the human rights situation in the country concerned; 
information gathering; and endeavouring to improve the human rights situation in that country.’ 
The issues discussed should be determined on a case by case basis but should include EU priority issues 
such as  
‘signing, ratification and implementation of international human rights instruments, cooperation with 
international human rights procedures and mechanisms, combating the death penalty, combating 
torture, combating all forms of discrimination, children's rights, and in particular those of children in 
armed conflicts, women's rights, freedom of expression, the role of civil society and the protection of 
human rights defenders, international cooperation in the field of  justice, in particular with the 
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International Criminal Court, promotion of the processes of democratisation and good governance, the 
rule of law and the prevention of conflict.’160 
The nature and scope of the EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues speak to the EU’s engagement 
with specific countries. Their usefulness in assessing the effectiveness of AU-EU dialogues is, perhaps, 
limited to the general underlying principles governing the dialogues and the issues up for dialogues. It 
is to be noted that within the framework of the Africa-EU Partnership, the EU has mainstreamed 
governance and human rights issues and set up dialogues to shape common understanding around 
human rights and governance issues. However, human rights issues are not so visibly mainstreamed 
in the political dialogues with sub-regional bodies. This raises questions about consistency and 
coherence of approach as expected by the guidelines. With respect to human rights themes for 
discussion during the dialogues, the AU-EU human rights dialogues have discussed identified themes 
such as children’s rights, gender equality and international justice.  
One main concern with the AU-EU dialogues is the lack of regular and comprehensive review of 
effectiveness. The review undertaken of the different partnerships within the framework of JAES is 
too general to cover the specificities of the governance and human rights dialogues. Within the 
framework of human rights dialogues with third countries regular review is recommended, and the 
COHOM is mandated to carry out such an assessment.161 There is no similar arrangement within the 
AU-EU Partnership framework and dialogues. 
ii. AU-EU human rights dialogue 
1. Setting the context 
In the Joint Africa EU Strategy, the parties agreed to ‘facilitate an open, intensive and comprehensive 
dialogue on all aspects and concepts of governance, including human rights.’162 The reason for the 
dialogue being that it will help the parties to ‘define the issues at stake, agree on common positions 
on issues of common concern and jointly undertake specific initiatives and actions.’163 The mandate 
of the various dialogues between the AU and EU that are discussed below is embedded in this 
paragraph. 
2. Human Rights Dialogue 
In 2008, the AU and EU started a regular conversation on human rights issues. The purpose was to 
‘enable a comprehensive continent to continent dialogue and cooperation on aspects and concepts 
as … the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,’164 to share information on 
recent developments on human rights issues in Africa and Europe, to exchange views on sensitive 
issues of common concern towards achieving a common position and explore possibilities for 
                                                          
160EU guidelines on human rights dialogues with third countries para 5. 
161EU guidelines on human rights dialogues with third countries para 10. 
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addressing some of the issues. One of the principles that guided the dialogue was ‘mutual respect and 
understanding, the respect of countries identities, and national priorities.’165 
Initially, the Dialogues took place twice a year; but since 2012 the Dialogue has been organised once 
a year and transformed from a technical meeting to a political one, led by the AU Commissioner on 
Political Affairs on the one side and the EU Special Representative on Human Rights on the other.166 
The Dialogue constitutes a component of the partnership on democratic governance and human 
rights.  
The Dialogue is conceived to serve as a space for key stakeholders, institutions, governments and civil 
society on both continents to contribute to the enhancement of democratic governance policies and 
respect for human rights. Two principles guide the implementation of the Africa-EU Partnership and, 
by implication, the Dialogue: 
 EU - Africa shared responsibility both in the delivery of the expected outcomes, the provision 
of policy inputs and material resources, including financing. 
 Both Africa and the EU will not reduce this partnership to the traditional development-
centred, donor-recipient relationship. Implementation must go ‘beyond development’, 
‘beyond Africa’, and ‘beyond institutions’.167 
The implementation of the partnership must take cognisance of ‘the different social, economic, 
political, and cultural contexts surrounding the two continents and, contribute to sensitizing both sides 
to their multiple challenges, obstacles, priorities and needs.’168 
3. Assessment of the Human Rights Dialogue 
The parties to JAES have committed themselves to a result-oriented partnership.169Bossuyt and 
Sherriff notes that 
‘measuring the performance of the JAES was bound to be a challenging exercise, considering its 
innovative nature, the diversity of stakeholders’ expectations, attribution problems as well as the lack 
of a clear and jointly agreed methodology to measure performance.’170 
The same clearly applies to the Dialogue. Nonetheless, an attempt will be made here to evaluate the 
strategic goal of the Dialogue, the quality of the Dialogue, the underpinning institutional arrangements 
that should facilitate the implementation of the outcomes of the Dialogue as well as linkages and 
complementarity of the Dialogue with other related processes.  
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The following indicators will be used to assess how the Dialogue has performed: (1) Openness and 
inclusiveness of the Dialogue; (2) AU-EU joint positions and influence within the AU, UN and other 
international fora based on the strategic position of the JAES; and (3) increased synergies and 
linkages.171 
Inclusiveness 
One of the key objectives and commitment of the parties to the JAES is to ‘facilitate and promote a 
broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership … empower non-state actors and create 
conditions to enable them to play an active role in development, democracy building, conflict 
prevention and post-conflict reconstruction processes.’172 This commitment to build a partnership 
beyond Africa and beyond institutions, a dialogue between the peoples of the two continents is 
dependent on how open and inclusive the Dialogue is. 
Somehow Africa and the EU do not understand inclusiveness to mean the same thing. As a result, the 
two continents could not, at the initial stages of the Dialogue, agree on the nature, scope and extent 
of participation of civil society organisations in the Dialogue. These differences between the AU and 
the EU proved to be an obstacle at the initial stage of operationalizing the Dialogue.173 While the AU 
on its part interpreted civil society to mean only the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), 
its official civil society organ, the EU construed civil society actors in broader terms.174 
Even though there is still no specific civil society platform dedicated to engaging with the Dialogue, 
there is a civil society forum engaging with JAES process and structures. This CSO engagement has a 
spillover effect on the Dialogue. The first Africa-EU CSO Forum took place in Cairo in 2010 and the 
second in Brussels in 2013. The CSO Forum made recommendations during its first meeting. In 2011, 
the parties to JAES during the 8th Dialogue only ‘noted the progress made with regard to the 
implementation of the outcomes of [CSO Forum] previous seminars’,175 without giving details. 
Inclusiveness is not just about the participation of CSO, it is also about other important stakeholders 
such as the private sector and independent players.  It was not until the 9th Dialogue that the parties 
decided to include actors other than state agents directly in the Dialogue. The President of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Chairperson of the African Committee of Experts on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child were among those invited for this Dialogue.176 It is also during the 9th 
Dialogue that concrete evidence of result from the CSO Forum parallel meetings started to be seen. 
The parties decided to implement a CSO recommendation by organising an experts meeting on 
implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.177 
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In spite of this progress, during the 4th CSO Forum in 2013 CSOs representatives decided to make the 
demand for a space for civil society participation in the structure and processes of JAES, a standing 
feature of their recommendations.178 In addition, the CSOs participants specifically requested two 
seats for their representatives at the April 2014 AU-EU Summit.179 However, in the outcome document 
of April 2014 AU-EU Summit, the Summit simply took ‘note of the Africa-EU civil society organisations' 
forum meeting of October 2013 and of the youth forum of April 2014.’ 180 Unlike the previous 
dialogues, there was no commitment in the 2014 outcome document to attend to CSO concerns and 
recommendations. 
It would seem from the above examples that, so far, civil society participation in the AU-EU Dialogues 
is peripheral and not embedded in all the stages of the process. There is also no strategy and structure 
to allow other important actors in governance and human rights to participate meaningfully in the 
Dialogue. This is certainly contrary to the criteria provided by the European Council to the effect that 
civil society organisations and other non-state actors are expected to and should participate actively 
in ‘the various phases involved in preparing; following up and assessing the human rights dialogues 
and consultations.’ 181 The lack of meaningful participation of civil society organisations, independent 
stakeholders and the private sector in the Dialogue not only defeats the goal to build a people-to-
people partnership, but also negatively affects the broader buy-in and ownership of the Dialogues. 
Consequently, the Dialogue, as it stands now, is significantly rendered non-inclusive. 
Global influence 
JAES is predicated on a ‘shared vision’ and a ‘consensus of values, common interests, and common 
strategic objectives’ between Africa and the EU on continental as well as global issues of common 
interest to the parties to it. The parties want to facilitate a collective voice and unity of action of the 
two continents on global issues of strategic interests concerning them. To what extent has JAES 
contributed to help Africa and the EU forge a common position on the global scene on human rights 
issues?  
Assessing the external impact of a country or group of countries in a multi-layered global system of 
governance and policy making is, by no means, an easy undertaking. Haastrup suggests that one way 
to do this is to start by contrasting expectations and capabilities of the actor(s) intending to 
influence.182 It is also suggested that external influence could be assessed through agency, power, 
opportunity, presence, and role-playing of the actor(s) and constraints on the global scene.183  This 
study will use these benchmarks to evaluate whether the inter-continental human rights dialogues 
between Africa and the EU have translated into shared vision and common values on international 
human rights issues. 
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There are some evidence suggesting that the parties seem to believe their partnership is working on 
the global level.184 The first time the parties showed interest to work together on common approaches 
especially in the United Nations’ General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights was in 
the Third Ministerial Troika of December 2004.185 This commitment led to the creation, in 2007, of an 
expert AU-EU forum to discuss human rights. In 2008, Ministerial Troika noted the dialogue between 
the two continents on global human rights issues ‘has been strengthened’.186 The parties believe that 
their commitment to work together at Rio +20 was a sign that the shared values of the two continents 
were at work on a common front. According to AU Ambassador Ajay Kumar Bramdeo, speaking about 
the outcome of Rio+ 20, ‘for the outcomes it is also a sign of a very strong relationship that we have 
in the Africa-EU Partnership, charting our way forward towards our common destiny.’ 187 
In 2009 the EU prepared a position paper on areas of common interests and possible cooperation at 
the global level. The AU responded to this position paper in 2010. The harmonised positions of the 
Africa-EU as outlined in this position paper resulted into areas of global cooperation that were 
eventually captured in the second Plan of Action. These are: Universal Periodic Review, the rights of 
vulnerable groups including, children women and people with disability; racial discrimination, racism, 
xenophobia and hatred. 
Independent observers are not optimistic about the extent of the global influence generated by the 
AU-EU Partnership in general and, by extension, the Dialogue in particular.188 Such scepticism is not 
without basis. On international justice, for example, the AU position and that of the EU are divergent 
with respect to indictments of African heads of state by the ICC.189 There are other areas of differences, 
such as civil society participation in political processes, the role of the media in promoting democratic 
accountability and LGBT rights,190 and how to prevent the deaths of migrants on their way to Europe 
and the treatment of African migrants who make it to the EU. Furthermore, a side by side comparison 
of European Union’s Council Conclusions on Post-2015 and the African Union’s Common African 
Position on Post-2015 reveals differences in emphasis.191 For instance, whereas the latter places 
emphasis on fundamental socioeconomic issues such as shelter, human development and equitable 
access to water, the latter focuses on access to justice, accountable institions and sustainable 
development. However, sometimes open dialogue is held on issues were there is quite divergent 
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opinion such as business and human rights.192 There are also joint initiatives in relation to some 
controversial issues such as migration through for example the so called Khartoum process.193 
There are still ‘intractable obstacles to substantive cooperation’ 194 by Africa and the EU at the global 
level. These obstacles include disparities in global power dynamics between Africa and the EU which 
might lead to different levels of engagement and interests at global level. Again development gap, and 
critically lack of internal coherence and consistency of the EU, its member states and the AU position 
on concrete issues up for discussion at multi-lateral fora.The second factor for the slow progress at 
forging global consensus might be as a result of the failure of Africa-EU to unpack ‘and openly discuss 
principles, values and fundamental action points for a more representative international governance 
system’ 195 that other actors could agree to. In addition, it could also be as a result of unrealistic 
expectations of the parties. In a partnership already struggling with a number of internal conflicting 
positions, it could have been more reasonable to adopt a more pragmatic approach to international 
conversations. Such an approach could ensure that the efforts of the Partners are directed at 
‘minimising the scope of conflict, accepting the inevitability that positions will conflict and mitigating 
the impact of such conflicts in the longer term interests of the partnership’, for instance.196 
It is, therefore, reasonable to say that the partners to AU-EU Partnership and the Dialogue are still in 
the process of putting their house in order and that they are not yet in a position to exert meaningful 
joint influence on common global human rights issues. In addition, divergent views on some of the 
human rights issues might continue to make difficult the process of attaining a common position 
between these two parties at the global level. 
Increased synergies 
The Dialogues are meant to improve the situation of human rights on the ground in third countries.197 
The success of the Dialogue, as a political process is, to a large extent, determined by how linked the 
Dialogue and its outcomes are to other processes and mechanisms designed to promote and protect 
human rights. Participation of all relevant key stakeholders in the dialogue as well as deliberate 
institutional design to link the outcomes of the human rights dialogues with national, regional and 
continental political, governance and human rights processes are crucial to ensure synergy and 
implementation. 
For example, treaty bodies in the two continents, sub-regional courts, in the case of Africa, and civil 
society organisations are some of the relevant stakeholders whose roles should not be peripheral to 
the process of the human rights dialogues. To increase synergy, the parallel and ad hoc mechanism 
the Dialogue avails to these actors has implication for enhancing synergy which is crucial to enabling 
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the dialogues have  an impact on the situation of human rights on the two continents. Synergies are 
needed not only between the Dialogue and the work of other human rights actors, but also with 
governance processes and mechanisms on the two continents. 
Currently, there is no strong evidence suggesting that a deliberate mechanism for ensuring synergies 
does exist. The Dialogue takes place mainly between institutional actors. Civil society actors hold a 
parallel process to influence the Dialogue. There is no clear understanding of how the inputs of non-
state actors are incorporated, nor how non-state actors could be involved in implementing the 
outcomes of the Dialogue. For instance, how the process of Dialogue feeds into similar activities by 
mechanisms at national, sub-regional and regional levels is not very clear. 
iii. Africa-EU Platform for Dialogue on Governance and Human Rights 
Dialogue seems to be the most preferred option to establish the ‘Euro-African consensus on values;’198 
establish a ‘people-centred-partnership’ 199 and facilitate an African-EU ‘common and coordinated 
positions’ 200 on global issues. Thus, one of the key activities within the framework of JAES was the 
creation of an ‘informal and inclusive’ platform, the Africa-EU Platform for dialogue on governance 
and human rights, for dialogue on all governance issues of mutual interests.201 
The objectives of the Platform include ensuring ‘a transparent, democratic and accountable 
environment in the respect of human rights and the rule of law; contributing to reducing fragility, 
fostering political stability and effective governance; and enabling sustainable and inclusive 
development and growth.’202 The Platform would include conversations on cooperation on democratic 
governance issues; fight against corruption and money laundering; strengthening the role of public 
sector institutions; monitoring of elections by the AU in African countries; defence of human rights in 
Africa and Europe; gender equality, the rights of the most vulnerable groups; dialogue between 
human rights institutions from both continents; active participation of civil society in Africa-EU 
dialogue and cooperation; supporting the African Governance Architecture; and fight against illicit 
trafficking of cultural goods. 
The operationalization of the Platform is emblematic of the divergences and convergences in values 
and views between the two continents. To start, EU and Africa had different interpretation and 
expectations with respect to their common commitment to create a Platform to serve as an open and 
inclusive forum for discussing all aspects of governance on the two continents and globally. The EU on 
its part understood the Platform to be an informal and all inclusive event to exchange views, 
experience and expertise on all aspects of governance and human rights. On the African side, the 
understanding was that the Platform was a formal, institutionalised and opened only to institutional 
actors with mandate on governance and human rights.203 
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In addition, there were also differences relating to the guiding principles of the Platform. The EU 
wanted the Platform to be guided by the principles of shared responsibility ‘both in the delivery of the 
expected outcomes, the provision of policy inputs and material resources’; and, second, to be guided 
by JAES commitments to ensure that the dialogues be ‘beyond development’, ‘beyond Africa’ and 
‘beyond institutions.’ The AU insisted that the overall operationalization of the Platform should 
depend on the consolidation of the AGA, agreed governance arrangement for the Platform and clear 
mechanism on the format and modalities of the Platform.  It further proposed that only institutional 
actors with governance mandate and link to AGA can participate in the processes and structures of 
the Platform.204 
To resolve these differences, a multi stakeholder workshop was conducted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
in 2009. The purpose of the Workshop was to ‘refine respective African and EU positions on the 
content, format and modalities of the Platform.’ 205 The Workshop agreed that in order for the 
Platform to add value to the relationship between the two continents, it must: 
 Facilitate the generative capacities of the actors on the two continents to function effectively. 
 Assist and inform decision making; 
 Be a process rather than an event; 
 Be integrated with decision making infrastructure on the two continents; 
 Have an autonomous and structured funding; 
 Be reviewed annually. 
The constitutive meeting in Brussels in 2010 built on and expanded on the above Addis acquis. It 
agreed that the Platform should operate on the basis of the following principles: innovation that 
avoids duplication, confidence building, and gradual development of institutions in phases.206 
To oversee the implementation of this consensus, an ad hoc structure – the Working Group - was set 
up to provide an informal space for multi actor dialogue, for a limited time, on specific governance 
issues, and to elaborate concrete proposals and recommendations for implementation.207 This 
Working Group constituted the building blocks of the Platform with the two Commissions as guardians 
of the Dialogues. All actors, including CSOs, participated on equal footing in constituting this Working 
Group. Focal points from Africa and EU facilitate the setup, coordination and timely production of 
outcomes. In 2011, Africa and EU agreed on the working methods of the Working Group. 
However, even after the two consensus building meetings, at least two issues still remained 
unresolved. One was the funding model for the work of the Working Group. The debate was whether 
funding should be directed through the Platform to the Working Group or directly to the Working 
Group. The second issue was the link between the Platform and AGA. The African side seems to be 
resisting efforts to link AGA to the work of the Working Group. This raises issues of complementarity 
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and coherence between the Partners.  Despite these differences, it is worth noting that the strive to 
reach consensus indicates the capacity of the Africa-EU partnership to build bridges, but it also 
demonstrates that there are substantial issues that still hinder common understanding on a number 
of issues within the two continents and globally. 
The lack of reasonable space for non-state actors in the Dialogue alluded to earlier is, to an extent, 
remedied within the framework of the Platform. The Platform strives to capture the people-centred 
partnership component of the Africa-EU by including more actors. In the first Plan of Action, three 
actors were identified for the purpose of the continent-to-continent dialogues: African and EU 
member states, institutional actors and organs; and decentralised authorities, parliaments and CSOs. 
Due to divergent views on what constitute CSOs, one of the concerns of the Addis Ababa Multi-
Stakeholders Workshop was the ‘legitimacy of the actors to be involved in the platform in order to 
produce these outcomes.’ 208 
Consequently, CSOs were granted full participation on the Platform on equal footing with others  
actors and they participated fully in constituting the Working Group. However, there are still 
challenges with the participation of the CSOs in the Platform. First, while the EU Steering Group for 
the European CSOs is autonomous with very flexible selection criteria for participation in the dialogue, 
the African CSO Steering Group is chaired by ECOSSOC and consists of ECOSSOC members, non 
ECOSSOC members selected through restrictive criteria, and the AUC; so, while the EU CSOs enjoy 
informal and flexible space, their African counterparts operate within an institutional arrangement. 
The fact that there is no institutional arrangement on the European CSOs’ part also means that it 
makes it difficult for their African counterparts to coordinate concerns and positions with them.209 
In addition to these procedural challenges, there are some substantive concerns. The question that is 
being raised is whether participation by non-state actors meaningfully impacts decision making and 
policy directions of the Platform. This crucial question is difficult to be satisfactorily answered here; 
what is clear though is that some CSOs actors believe that their consultation, so far, is rather 
‘superficial… and [their] contribution not necessarily integrated into policy’.210 
The platform lacks visibility. However, the Africa-EU partnership web site notes that ‘the Platform has 
allowed for the formulation of shared governance agendas and recommendations that feed into 
political processes in areas such as the management of natural resources and freedom of expression.’ 
iv. EU-Africa Summit 
The change in the nature of the Africa-EU dialogue from a technical to a political process meant also 
that political discussion needed to occur at all levels of the political structures of the Partners. African 
and European Heads of State and Government meet every three years at Summit level to take 
decisions concerning relations between the two continents, embedded within the Joint Africa-EU 
Strategy.211 The EU-Africa Summit is the highest level of political dialogue between the two continents. 
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So far, there have been four summits. The Summit provides strategic direction for the partnership, 
discusses and explores solutions to common concerns and issues of mutual interests. 
In the period between Summits, Ministers of Foreign Affairs meet every six months to carry the 
political dialogue forward, review the implementation of the Joint Strategy / Action Plans, and provide 
political guidance, as necessary. In addition, the ministerial meetings are complemented by sector-
specific ministerial or senior officials meetings with inputs from the Joint Experts Groups and the Joint 
Task Force. The first Summit took place in Cairo in 2000 and marked the first time European and 
African leaders met at continental level to discuss, express and commit to come together and give a 
new dimension to their partnership. 
The second Summit took place in Lisbon in 2007. At that Summit, the two continents agreed to move 
from donorship to partnership and to build a relationship based on equality. The third Summit took 
place in Tripoli and the fourth one in Brussels. The Tripoli Summit focused on economic development, 
peace and security and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals [MDGs] in Africa by 
2015; and resulted into the Tripoli Declaration. The Brussels Summit focused on ‘Investing in people, 
prosperity and peace.’ 
The Summit is certainly a demonstration of the highest level of commitment to AU-EU Partnership. 
However, the usefulness of this platform will, to a large extent, depend on how the outcomes of the 
Summits are translated into actionable plans and implemented by all the structures of JAES. 
Additionally, the Summit provides opportunities for multiple formal and informal side events. These 
catalysing effects of the Summit should be utilised to secure popularisation of the outcomes and 
secure buy in from multiple stakeholders. The status of the decisions of the Summits within regional 
and continental systems is not very clear. Thus, the extent to which institutions, structures and 
initiatives in Europe and Africa either feel obliged or empowered to implement these outcome 
documents is crucial to the usefulness of the Summit. This is even more so in the African case where 
the status of the implementation of the decisions of the AU Summits is generally low.212 
v. EU-Africa High Level Policy Dialogue 
Established at the third Africa-EU Summit which took place in Tripoli in 2010, the EU-Africa High Level 
Policy Dialogue (Policy Dialogue) is a platform created within the partnership on science, technology 
and innovation to enhance coordination and cooperation. The Policy Dialogue takes place at the level 
of senior officials from the EU and AU and their member countries' ministries. While not directly 
related to human rights, there are aspects of the dialogue with human rights relevance. For example, 
the Bureau of the EU-Africa Policy Dialogue has chosen to focus on food and nutrition security, and 
sustainable agriculture.213 Considering that the agricultural sector occupies and plays a central role in 
the economic and social development in Africa, the dialogue holds the potential of contributing to 
improved food security.214 
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vi. Commission-to-Commission meetings 
The African and the European Union Commissions are the main actors and key ‘implementers’ of the 
Africa-EU Strategic Partnership; therefore, implementing the activities under all the partnerships 
within the JAES is the collective responsibility of the Commission. The two commissions have been 
meeting since 2005 to explore opportunities to enhance institutional cooperation between the 
commissions. These regular college meetings got new impetus with the adoption of JAES in 2007. 
As the nerve centre of the JAES implementation strategy, the shortcoming with respect to developing 
common values, common and coordinated positions between the continents and globally on issues of 
common interests rests at the door step of the two Commissions.  So far the Commissions have held 
seven one-day college-to-college meetings.215In the declaration adopted at the latest college-to-
college meeting in Brussels on 22 April 2015 the section on democracy, good governance and human 
rights is three paragraphs which includes:216 
 Reaffirmation of commitment to operationalization of the AGA and a strong African human 
rights system 
 Encouragement to African states to ratify regional human rights instruments 
 Collaboration in elections, including between observer missions, and in addressing corruption 
 Commitment to the objectives of the African year of women’s empowerment (2015) 
 Decision to hold next human rights dialogue in ‘the margins of the Banjul Commission in the 
coming months’ 
 Joint commitment to promote economic and social rights and  full respect of human rights in 
business activities  
This does not mean that these paragraphs are the only ones touching on human rights, for example 
the very current issue of migration to Europe is dealt with under the heading human development.  
vii. Sub-regional political dialogues 
Political dialogue has also been taking place between the EU and other sub-regional African 
organisations. The EU considers RECs as 'prime building blocks for EU-Africa relations'. As such, it is 
only through more intensive and substantive political dialogue and cooperation that the EU and sub-
regional African IOs will become better as strategic partners to face common challenges. 
                                                          
Commission (2015) Better refulation toolbox, available at < http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
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The EU and ECOWAS have a long-standing and continuous political dialogue, with interactions such as 
a twice-yearly ministerial troika and senior officials meetings.217The dialogue is broad focused on 
peace, security and stability, migration issues, drug trafficking and improved governance. There is no 
specific focus on human rights. Considering that most conflicts in the sub-region have been triggered 
by the prolifereation of small arms and light weapons and their ammunitions, the EU and ECOWAS 
agreed to enhance partnership in preventing, combating and eradicating their proliferation.218 In 
2006, the EU granted a financial support to a multi-donor project which aimed at strengthening the 
capacities of the regional body and its member states to control the movement of small arms. 
However, the implmentation of the initiative, which was termed the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP) was fraught with structural 
constraints, particularly competing and often conflicting priorities between the project and ECOWAS 
Small Arms Unit. Thus, in light of the inititatives slow progress, the EU and other donors in 2010 
decided not to prolong their support. 219 Meanwhile at the 20th political dialogue in November 2014, 
the EU ‘expressed its appreciation of the measures being taken by ECOWAS to defend the gains of the 
democratization process and the rule of law in West Africa.’220 
The EU has also been conducting political dialogue with the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) for the past twenty years. The SADC-EU dialogue was created with the aim of 
improving dialogue between the two parties, thereby contributing to peace, democracy and 
sustainable development among others.221  In the area of human rights, the SADC-EU dialogue has 
fared better as compared to the EU-ECOWAS dialogues with discussions centring on the human rights 
situation in specific countries. For example, freedom for the media was called for in discussions on 
Zimbabwe.222 This may be explained by the fact that the avowed objective of the dialogue is the 
respect for human rights.223 Nevertheless, the dialogue has lately been focused more on issues of 
climate change, regional integration and peace and stability as reflected in the 2013 communiqué of 
the SADC-EU Ministerial Political Dialogue.224 
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the EU have had a meeting at 
Ministerial Troika level in 2008. The discussion was dominated by issues of peace and security. Due to 
its geographical location, and consequently its member states, the ECCAS is necessarily concerned with 
protracted war in the Great Lakes region as well as with the instability in member states such as in 
Chad and Burundi.225 Although one of the objectives of the first Ministerial Troika meeting was to 
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establish a follow-up mechanism, the lack of information on the mechanism and on subsequent 
Ministerial Troika meetings augurs no good. It seems that this first meeting might also have been the 
last. 
The EU does however try to improve the situation of human rights in the East African region through 
the Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Programme, a tripartite collaboration 
between the EAC, COMESA and IGAD. Supported by the EU, the programme aimed at improving the 
capacity of oversight institutions such as the court, regional parliaments and civil society.226Human 
rights does not feature in dialogue with COMESA which is focused on development cooperation 
through trade and greater integration.2272014 saw the sixth Ministerial Meeting between IGAD228 and 
the EU, thus pointing to a long-standing dialogue and cooperation between the two parties. The 
dialogue with IGAD is however mostly focused on security matters with the conflict in Sudan, South 
Sudan and Somalia taking centre stage as evidenced by the last joint IGAD-EU communiqué.229 
C. Conclusions 
The AU and the EU have a long history of relationship. This relationship has evolved and transformed 
along the years. Theoretically, the relationship has evolved from a colonised/coloniser relationship to 
a partnership of equal parties within the framework of JAES. However, continued differences in 
history, culture, development and global power and standing between the AU and the EU make 
continued efforts to negotiate differences to consolidate commonalities inevitable. 
The AU-EU Strategic Partnership provides for the key steps that need to be taken to facilitate 
meaningful conversations between the two continents. The fledging platforms for dialogues on 
governance and human rights between the two continents are steps in the right direction. However, 
for these dialogues to be meaningful, first, they should be bold, frank and open on all issues of 
governance and human rights. Second, knowledge, capacity and resource deficits on the side of Africa 
need to significantly improve in order to make this partnership one of equals, in practical terms. 
The continent to continent conversations need to be more inclusive, consistent, coherent, 
institutionalised at all levels and interlinked with on-going processes on both sides. The capacity to 
implement and monitor implementation of responsible institutions urgently needs to be further 
strengthened. 
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VI. Financing 
A. EU financial contribution to the AU System 
1. History 
From 1975 to 2000, partnership between the EU and AU were conducted mainly in terms of the Lomé 
Conventions which were envisaged as a comprehensive trade agreement coupled with financial 
assistance. Although the partnership was between the then European Community and the ACP group, 
until the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, the term Africa was always limited to sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
With the adoption of the TEU in 1992, development policy was rigidly entrenched into the EU 
(supranational and member states) policy towards Africa. Support for African states and regional 
institutions was further reinforced with the adoption of the MDGs and the successive organisation of 
the International Conference on Financing for Development in 2002. These events triggered a boost 
in the volume of aid from both the EU Commission and member states. The EU collectively committed 
itself to boost aid from previous 0.33 percent to 0.39 of GNI by 2006.230 In reaching its target before 
the deadline, the EU in May 2005 set an enthusiastic target of reaching 0.56 and 0.7 percent of GNI by 
2010 and 2015 respectively.231 Half of these increases are to be allocated to sub-Saharan Africa. The 
increased commitment in quantity of aid made it more urgent for the Union to re-assess the issue of 
quality of aid, and for the EU to adopt a series of practical recommendations which serve as the basis 
for the Union’s common position on aid effectiveness.232 
In 2005, the European Parliament chaired a dialogue leading to the adoption of the European 
Consensus on Development (ECD). The ECD espoused EU’s principles and objectives on aid 
effectiveness with emphasis on donor coordination.  
With regard to support for the EU the focus is more on peace and security than democracy and human 
rights, even though as illustrated below there is significant financial support for the latter.  
2. Fields of funding 
a) European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) supports human rights and 
democratization efforts in third states and through partnership with intergovernmental institutions 
such as the AU. The mandate of the instrument consist of addressing issues such as torture, death 
penalty, socio-economic rights, women and children’s rights, electoral observation, and rights of LGBTI 
persons. However, considering that 90 % of the funds under this instrument are channeled to human 
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rights defenders and CSOs defending democracy and human rights, direct assistance to AU institutions 
for the implementation of international standards have been limited.233 
b) AU Support Programme 
The EU as part of its institutional support programme to the AU signed in 2006 a multilateral 
agreement with the AU Commission. As part of the agreement, the EU committed to the AU €55 
million as a means of facilitating an ‘integrated and comprehensive support’ to five main AU 
institutions with human rights mandates.234 Under the first phase (2006-2013), funding assisted the 
AU Commission, Pan African Parliament (PAP), African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights 
(African Commission) and the African Court for Human and Peoples' Rights (African Court) to revamp 
and enhance their capacities in human rights and democracy building. However, great challenges 
remain. For example the African Commission reported in its activity report covering the second half 
of 2014 that communications with its Secretariat in Banjul, The Gambia, is a serious challenge with 
telephones, email, internet and fax not functioning properly leading Member States and other 
stakeholders to express frustration.235 At the same time as there is a clear need for support, the African 
Commission has been critical of programme activities being supported exclusively by donors and that 
even many legal officers are paid by donors rather than by the EU. While receptive to this criticism the 
AU has not taken any action to address the situation by providing its own funding for programme 
activities.236With regards to the AU Commission, the financial assistance played a key role in the 
establishment of the African Governance Architecture (AGA), though challenges still remain in the 
operationalization of AGA and its Platform.237 
c) AU Support Programme II 
The EU in March 2014 renewed funding for the AU Support Programme. AUSP II has a three year life 
span (2014-2017) with a financial envelope of €28.8 Million.238 €3 Million was set aside from the 
original amount as a contribution to the refurbishment of the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. The 
primary objective for the renewal of the AUSP according to the EU is based on its commitment to the 
AU ‘in terms of capacity building, institutional and programme implementation’.239 Moreover, as a 
‘flagship programme’ of the AU-EU strategic partnership initiatives, AUSP II is envisaged to provide 
intervention to the ‘acceleration of African integration and sustainable development efforts’ in 
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addition to enhancing the capacity of the AU institutions, particularly those with democracy and 
human rights mandates.  
d) Security Sector Capacity-Building Programme 
With the aim of enhancing the AU’s capacity in providing intervention in areas such as conflict 
prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, the AU commission in 
January 2013 adopted the Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (PFSSR). Despite being 
initiated by the AU Commission and implemented by diverse domestic and international actors,240 the 
initiative is funded solely by the EU. As of the end of September 2014, the EU has committed €85 
million to the framework.241 
e) Pan-African Programme 
In 2009, the AU called on the EU for the establishment of a financial instrument to facilitate the Joint-
AU-EU strategy. Based on EU Regulation No. 233/2014, the Pan-African Programme (PanAF) was 
established as a financing development cooperation instrument (DCI) for a six year period (2014-
2020). With an initial financial envelope of €845 million channelled to the programme,242 it is expected 
that the AU will be able to utilize this resource to reduce poverty which is considered as a ‘primary 
objective of EU development policy’. Again, considering that the PanAF is not a replacement but a 
supplementary of existing EU financial instruments, it complements the operationlisation of the 
overarching objectives of the recent outcome of the 4th AU-EU Summit in Brussels in April 2014. PanAF 
is tailored towards providing interventions in areas such as (i) democracy, rule of law and human 
rights; (ii) peace and security; (iii) global and cross-cutting issues; (iv) human development; and (v) 
sustainable and inclusive development and growth as well as continental integration. Initiatives under 
this framework will facilitate progress on the eradication of hunger and poverty (MDG 1) through the 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).  
Whilst considerable importance is placed on regional integration (51 percent), human development 
and human rights related issues receive the second (22 percent) and fourth priorities (11 percent) 
respectively. This breakdown establishes that the EU places higher premium on regional integration 
for trade purposes than issues of human rights and democracy building which are constant rhetoric of 
the Union and its member states. Funds for the instrument will be drawn from the 11th EDF. 
f) ComprehensiveAfrica Agriculture Development 
Programme 
The EU continues to provide relief to food security actions within the framework of the African-led 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). Adopted in 2003, the 
overarching aim of CAADP is to help AU institutions to assess and plan strategies for food security in 
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the region. Taking into account, the fact that the programme is an essential framework for 
development cooperation within the AU on agriculture, the EU relies on two instruments for 
collaboration. These are the EDF and the EU Food Security Thematic Programme. Accordingly, as of 
September 2014, the EU has contributed€5 million to support the multi-donor trust fund established 
by the AU Commission and the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (NPCA).243 The assistance 
provides support tailored towards the strengthening of the institutional capacity of AU institutions to 
effectively operationalise the continental agriculture development policy.244 
g) African Peace Facility 
Established in 2004, the African Peace Facility (APF) is the main EU funding instrument for promoting 
peace and security in Africa.245 Though its original remit was to provide funding for African-led peace 
support operations (PSOs), since the establishment of JAES, this mandate has been extended to 
support the ‘peace and security’ ambit of the JAES which include (i) operationlisation of the African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); (ii) provide funding for African-led peace support operations 
(PSOs); and (iii) enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security in Africa. Through this facility, 
the AU through its Peace and Security Council (PSC) have successfully enhanced capacity of the African 
Standby Force (ASF), provided PSOs in addition to the development of an early response mechanism.  
In terms of capacity building, the facility has supported the AU Commission specifically through the 
employment of personnel in its Peace and Security Department arms; whiles providing workshops for 
the African Standby Force (ASF). Whereas €1,052.1million was allocated to PSOs, capacity building and 
early response mechanism (ERM) received only €97.2 million and €15 million respectively.  
Nonetheless, Olsen246 avers that the facility has the potential of paving ‘the way for a strong African 
involvement in conflict management’ and intervention in PSOs would not have been possible without 
the assistance of the APF.  
Olsen247 avers that the large amount of aid allocated to ‘security-related programmes ultimately seem 
to suggest that selfish concerns have become increasingly more important in comparison to altruistic 
concerns’. First, by emphasizing on security as core component of the EU strategy for Africa, it 
entrenches the position of France and UK as permanent members of the Security Council. Second, it 
is inevitable for the Union to provide aid to the AU in order to avoid mass migration to Europe from 
conflict affected AU states. This collaboration, as evident by several PSOs is built on a division of labor. 
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Accordingly, as the EU supplies the funds and logistical support, the AU provides ‘boots on the 
ground’.248 
B. Member state initiatives 
Cooperation between the German Government (GIZ) and the AU Commission in the field of good 
governance commenced in 2006.GIZ has provided extensive support to the operationalisation of AGA 
as well as to African regional human rights institutions such as the African Court and Commission and 
support to the AU Commission’s Department of Political Affairs and Department of Social Affairs.  
With GIZ financial support of €6.5 million for the period October 2010 to September 2013, the AU 
Commission through its Democracy and Electoral Unit, provided capacity development assistance to 
National Election Management Bodies and Election Observation Missions to member states before 
and during elections. Regarding human rights related issues, cooperation has been broadened to assist 
the DSA in combating violations such as Harmful Traditional Practices (HTP); specifically Female 
Genital Mutilation (FGM). This is area is being tackled through the effective operationalization of 
gender policies in AU member states.249 
Initiated in December 2010, the AU Governance and Capacity Building Programme 2011-2012 (GCP) 
is a joint Department for International Development(DFID-United Kingdom) and Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency Programme. The mandate of the initiative is to assist the AU 
Commission in promotion of good governance and rule of law in AU member states. With £4,614,775 
(93.47%) drawn from the original budget of £4,937,328 by the end of 31 March 2014, the AU 
Commission achieved some success in areas of public sector policy and election 
monitoring.250Following the expiry of the first phase of the programme in 2013, it has been extended 
to provide support for the AU Commission’s Strategic Plan 2013-2016 towards improving the 
continent’s good governance, democratic principles as well as peace and security. However, it is 
imperative to point out that the effectiveness of the programme will depend on the manner in which 
the AU Commission takes ownership of its implementation. 
C. EU financial contribution to RECs 
In the overarching instrument adopted by the European Commission in 2005 and referred to as the 
‘EU Strategy for Africa’, the Union affirmed its commitment to collaborate with ‘sub-regional 
organisations’ (RECs) in addressing Africa’s manifold problems.251 The document covers a tenyear-
period (2005-2015) and affirms commitments in the field of human rights, peace and security and 
democracy building.252 However, much of the support provided to RECs has been focused on regional 
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integration rather than human rights.253 Some institutional support has been targeted at regional 
political co-operation and institutional capacity development such as the support of the EU and GIZ to 
SADC from 2012 onwards.254 It should be noted that this support was provided in a context where the 
SADC Tribunal, which had handed down progressive human rights judgments, was dismantled by the 
SADC Summit following a judgment that upset Zimbabwe.255 
Support provided to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to improve the 
security situation in central Africa was made conditional on ECCAS merging with the 
CommunautéÉconomique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) which has a membership that 
overlaps with ECCAS.256 Security and improved governance has also been a focus area in support to 
ECOWAS257 and for IGAD where the EU in 2014 provided a financial envelope of €1.1 million through 
which IGAD was expected to collaborate with the AU Commission and the international community 
to seal an agreement for resolving the hostility between the government and the opposition in South 
Sudan. 
D. Evaluation on aid earmarking, coordination and effectiveness 
‘Effective multilateralism’ according to Whiteman &Haastrup258  has become a chief aim of the EU’s 
development policy towards the AU. Seemingly, one of the overarching foreign policy aims of the EU 
is to become an autonomous development actor within the AU, particularly through the consolidation 
of its efforts at both the horizontal (within the Commission and/or the Council) and vertical level 
(between EU institutions and member states). Indeed, the effective remedy for the fragmentation and 
achievement of greater cohesiveness certainly depends on the extent of convergence of preferences 
between the supranational institutions and the member states.259 
For this reason, the European Union’s (Commission and member states) competencies, apart from 
being a funder for AU projects is to constructively and systematically exploit potential to promote 
coordination, coherence and complementarities within the Union and among member states in 
advancing the EU’s common position in the AU.260So, beyond enacting several policy 
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recommendations towards improving coherence, the European Commission endorsed in 2005 the 
Paris Declaration agenda and also put forward an integrated EU position on aid at the 2008 Third High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra. As a step towards achieving the targets of the Paris 
Declaration and the objectives of the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), the EU’s Official ODA to the AU 
member states grew by 26 percent (€2.7 billion) from 2004 to 2009.261 This constituted 40 percent of 
the EU’s external aid funds. Yet, this increase did not address the problem of fragmented and 
uncoordinated EU bilateral and multilateral aid to the AU (institutions and member states). 
Using an aggregate data from fourteen selected EU member states and the European Commission, 
only forty-six percent of member states and the European Commission jointly used coordinated 
mechanisms for aid delivery.262 Moreover, the European Commission alone scored a lesser (44 per 
cent) in this area. In terms of coordinated missions, the European Commission and member states 
convergence effort was even poorer with a percentage of thirty-three. In light of the above 
development, one observer has affirmed that ‘empirical evidence suggests that there was even less 
coordination in the first decade of the new century than in previous decades’.263 
Thus, notwithstanding the numerous commitments made at different international forums and the 
emergence of new standards (EU target, AAA and Paris agenda) the EU is still battling to address aid 
fragmentation. Knack and Rahman264 have affirmed that aid proliferation and fragmentation beyond 
placing high bureaucratic cost on multilateral institutions like the AUnurtures corruption and results 
in waste of resources. This lack of cohesiveness has not only led to minimal success of many EU 
interventions within the AU, but ‘has undermined the EU’s credibility’.265 
E. Conclusions 
Beyond strengthening existing AU regional programmes, the EU and its member states have sought 
to initiate new programmes at the AU level for the implementation of international norms. On the 
other hand, the EU’s security engagement with the AU has, over time overshadowed other important 
themes such as human rights and democracy. This is evidenced in the significant amount of resources 
allocated for security-related programme in the AU. However, one important dimension of this 
development has been the EU’s enthusiasm to cooperate with the AU, particularly with the 
establishment and continuous funding of the APF. Yet in examining the role of the EU in this area, it is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that its aim is to build its identity and presence as a security actor and 
peace-builder rather than merely to solve the manifold of crises in the region.  
It is apparent that the EU’s policies and roles in the AU demonstrate several institutional tensions 
arising from the framing and execution of policies. Although the European Consensus on Development 
and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy have contributed to an enhancement of the Union’s development 
cooperation with the AU, the European Commission and EU member states are still not functioning as 
coherent and unified development actor.266  Instead, the European Commission operates separately 
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and it is often envisaged as the ‘29th member state’ or just another actor. A major rationale advanced 
for this lack of coordination and complementarity has been the European Commission’s inability to 
lead the process of merging the geostrategic interests of most member states in its quest of acting as 
unified actor with the AU. Therefore for the EU to overcome its shortcoming in the fields of foreign 
aid to the AU there is the need to act cohesively and autonomously whilst projecting a common vision 
as espoused in JAES. 
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VII. Case studies 
A. Food security 
1. Introduction 
Food security or the right to adequate food is fundamental for the realisation of other human rights. 
Without the fundamental right to be free from hunger, other human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(such as the right to life andhealth) lose their meaning and importance.267  Food security according to 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is when ‘all people, at all times, have physical and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life.’268While not explicitly set out as a right in European human 
rights law, the right to food is clearly linked to other rights such as the right to social security 
recognised in article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In Africa the 
right to food, while not explicitly included in the African Charter, has been held by the African 
Commission as an implied right.269 
The EUhas over the years taken numerous steps both at the regional and country levels ‘to address 
crises which undermine agriculture production and the movement of food to the market, and have 
adverse effect on availability’.270 At the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007, the EU and AU 
committed to promote and enhance policy coherence for development in areas of food safety, food 
security and food quality.271  The emphasis on policy coherence in the text is significant for African 
food security for two reasons; (i) it means that the Union commits to enhance the availability of food 
by increasing the volume of aid; and (ii) refrain from creating hurdles for African development whilst 
pursuing its domestic policies.   
Further, the EU under a new bilateral engagement with the AU on agriculture advancement 
committed to extend support to the AU’s agriculture framework as entrenched in CAADP.272 It has 
therefore supported steps and strategies such as early warning systems (EWS) to address unforeseen 
‘shocks’ inter alia severe drought and flooding.273 The EU and the AU under JAES also committed to 
enhancing policy coherence for control, trade and development in fisheries.274 The achievement of 
such initiatives is imperative, particularly if food security in shock-prone regimes is to be assured.  
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Although the EU is not the sole actor in this field, its role in the African food security is pronounced. 
As observed byEngel et al,275 some of the EU’s policies are still debated as inadequate in strengthening 
the region’s agricultural and fishery development.   
This case-study provides an overview of how the EU interacts and collaborates with the AU and RECs 
in tackling hunger and malnutrition in Africa. To do this, it will provide an overview of the policy 
interrelations and collaboration between the EU external policy and the AU in ensuring sustainable 
agriculture and improve access to adequate and nutritious food in African countries.  
2. Context 
The principal aim of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)is to ensure ‘European self-sufficiency’ 
by protecting farmers’ income through subsidy.276 It was designed to achieve five basic ends: (i) 
stabilize markets; (ii) ensure availability of supplies (iii) enhance a fair standard of living for the 
agricultural community; (iv) accelerate agricultural productivity; and (vi) ensure reasonable prices to 
consumers.277 Its potential effect for addressing food insecurity in Africa are many and differ, 
depending on a country’s food import, dependence on production and consumption prices. It 
accounted for approximately 41 percent of the Union’s budget for 2013.278 It consists of two pillars, 
namely Pillar I (Direct payments) and Pillar II (Rural development).  
CAP has been chastised by scholars and development stakeholders for its domestic support and trade 
measures.279CAP has squeezed Africa from two sides: First the subsidies haveensured that surplus EU 
products were exported to Africa by paying exporting firms the difference between world market price 
and the EU in the form of subsidies. This has led to the accusation that the EU is dumping its surplus 
on the African markets. Although this assistance has contributed to cheap food imports to AU states, 
they have threatened efforts by local producers to compete with imports. Second, the subsidized 
production of competing crops harmed African producers of topical crops such as tobacco, sugar and 
cotton. Hence, products such as rice, meats, dairy products which are significantly protected by the 
CAP hardly figure at all in Africa’s exports to Europe.280 
A number of initiatives have been launched ‘which did not exist a decade or more ago’ in addressing 
famine.281 These initiatives were adopted in light of four areas of concern for food security, specifically 
(i) food availability; (ii) access to food; (iii) utilization that underlie chronic hunger; and (iv) the shocks 
that drive temporary food insecurity.  
Further, the efforts generally seek to improve collection, analysis and communication of data and 
information. These strategies undeniably have the prospect of tracking progress made, the success of 
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initiatives adopted to alleviate hunger, while keeping the issues high on the agenda of AU-EU policy 
makers.  
It is anticipated that these measures could alleviate the conditions that cause chronic hunger. A strong 
significance is however placed on boosting domestic food production at the national level, even 
though a glance at the record of the level of production across countries in the African region display 
a vast variation from country to country, despite their similarity in physical endowments or levels of 
development.282 
These initiatives thus seek to improve agricultural policy making of the AU. It is imperative to indicate 
that higher food production does not only have the prospect of cutting down prices of food but also 
creates more jobs and income opportunities for the rural poor. Rural or inland farmers will produce 
more at lower prices especially if their input-output ratios improve.  
3. AU initiatives 
a) Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP) 
In 2003 CAADP was established by the AU. Its overarching aim is to raise agricultural productivity by 
at least six per cent per year through increase of public investment in agriculture to 10 percent of 
national annual budgets. It rests on four key pillars.  
Pillar I encompasses land and water management. This pillar aims to extend the area under 
sustainable land and reliable water management (SLWM) systems. It therefore calls for support in 
building soil fertility whilst increasing irrigation, particularly small-scale irrigation.  
Pillar II relates to market access. This segment advocates for accelerated growth in the agricultural 
sector by raising the capacities of private entrepreneurs whilst improving local infrastructure such as 
transportation, storage and packaging, retail facilities, information technology and overall supply 
chains.  
Pillar III covers food supply and hunger. This component seeks to reduce hunger by increasing food 
supply in the region through raising smallholder productivity whiles improving responses to food 
emergencies. It specifically focuses on the chronically food insecure, by improving domestic 
production and marketing, facilitate regional trade in staple foods as well as build household 
productivity and assets.  
Finally, pillar IV pertains to agricultural research and dissemination. Under this pillar, CAADP seeks to 
improve agriculture production through the distribution of appropriate new technologies in order to 
assist farmers adopt such new options in their implementations.  
In particular, under the third Pillar, a number of activities have been undertaking by the EU to ensure 
the effective realization of the objectives of CAADP. Some of these initiatives include the (i) Regional 
Enhanced Livelihoods for Pastoral Areas (RELPA) for improving the livelihoods of pastoralists; (ii) 
Making Markets Work for the Poor: Enhancing Food Security and Productivity Growth in Eastern and 
Southern Africa (MMWP) which involves a three-year capacity building programme for strengthening 
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regional agricultural productivity, food security and poverty reduction; (iii) the Improved Regional 
Trade in Food Staples (RTFS) equally aims at assembling spatial evidence on existing regional 
productivity and trade in staple food. It is moreover developing predictive systematic tools that 
enhance spatial survey of the conclusion arising from standard natural and policy shocks with regards 
to agriculture at the regional and national levels.  
Prominent among the European Commission’s funding support include €5 million contribution 
towards a project aimed at capacity-building for CAADP institutions and processes.283 The Commission 
has also in total provided € 26 million in support of various agricultural programmes.  
b) AU social policy framework  
The AU Commission’s programme on social development is derived from the need to ‘reverse’ the 
region’s poverty and improve the ‘cumulative process of under development’.284 It was against this 
backdrop that the AU recognized that agricultural production as well as income in the region has been 
negatively affected by the predominantly substandard, flawed and unproductive agrarian system.285 
Thus, a combination of external setbacks including lack of micro financing, poor infrastructure, 
livestock diseases and climate change have equally contributed to food insecurity and exacerbated 
the poverty situation of many African’s rural poor, whose livelihood largely depend on subsistence 
agriculture.286 
Consequently, in seeking to address the increased morbidity and mortality of children as a result of 
lack of vitamin A and nutritional anaemia, the AU Commission adopted a number of resolutions.287 
These resolutions set out how the AU will address food insecurity in Africa. Broadly, the AU 
Commission under this social framework called for the implementation of the commitments 
undertaken under the CAADP as well as the 2004 Sirte Declaration on Agriculture and Water. It further 
called for support towards the operationalization of the 2005-2015 African Regional Nutritional 
Strategy whilst calling on political leaders to provide necessary incentives and support to small 
producers aimed at boosting agricultural production. The framework finally called on AU leaders to 
enact and implement legislation to promote production of drought resistant crops and preserve land 
for food crops. 
Consequently, due to the growing awareness of the important role of social protection to the 
realisation of human rights through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the EU has sought to 
boost sustainable development through its Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME) partnership 
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with the AU.288 With sub-Saharan Africa’s susceptibility to internal and external shocks, the EU tailored 
its 2010 European Report on Development to focus on ‘Social protection for inclusive development’ 
with specific emphasis on mapping strategies for boosting sub-Saharan Africa’s resilience to 
unexpected shocks, combat poverty and protect existing gains.289 The report affirmed that social 
protection is feasible and possible especially where there is broad-based social consensus, such as the 
involvement of civil society organisations (CSOs). Following the adoption of the second AU-EU Action 
Plan (2011-2013),290 the parties reaffirmed their commitment to reinforce cooperation in key areas 
such as investment, job creation and economic growth as a vehicle for achieving both economic 
growth and poverty reduction.291 
c) AU Commission Agriculture and Food Security Division 
Recognizing that agriculture is the primary element for the attainment of food security and alleviation 
of hunger in the region, the Agriculture and Food Security Division (AFSD) of the AU Commission was 
established. The primary objective of the unit is to coordinate and harmonize agricultural policies and 
initiatives as a means of enhancing the livelihoods and food security of Africans.292 The AFSD is further 
expected to strengthen the resilience of African food production system through the value chain 
approach in the context of climate change. More so, it is anticipated to facilitate the implementation 
of the CAADP agenda whiles improving ministerial coordination of regional level policy making on 
agriculture and food security. In consequence, since its inception, it has strengthened the capacity of 
farmer organisations through the adoption of agricultural health and food safety standards plus 
improving policy environment for market access to food.293 
d) Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) 
Created in 2006, the AGRA was launched under the AU Commission with an overriding purpose of 
‘dramatically’ improving African agriculture as well as increase the productivity and profitability of 
smallholder farmers.294 Consequently, it has developed to scale successful models across the value 
chain in four basic areas, namely, soils, seeds, policies and markets. Aside these areas, AGRA provides 
interventions on other cross-cutting issue that ensure merger in the agricultural value chains, 
particularly through partnership among African governments, civil society organisations (CSOs), the 
private sector and farmers. By the end of November 2014, the initiative was providing interventions 
to African farmers including (i) Programme for Africa's Seed Systems (PASS); (ii) Soil Health Programme 
(SHP); and (iii) Market Access Programme. Some of these programmes have been supported by the 
EU.295 
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e) Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) 
Originally developed in Somalia in 2004, the IPC is a standardized tool that aims at improving 
techniques for assessment of food crises. Thus, by having a common denominator for classifying food 
security, this initiative makes it easier for the AU, governments, donors and agencies to identify 
priorities for food assistance before they become severe. Against this backdrop, the EU has been a key 
funder of this initiative since 2006.296 Thus, within the framework of the ‘Improved global governance 
for hunger reduction’ project, the EU has provided the IPC partnership with a four-year grant 
extending from 2012-2015.  
4. REC initiatives 
a) COMESA Agriculture Policy (CAP) 
COMESA states are cognizant of the importance that agriculture plays in the sub-region. It was against 
this backdrop that the Secretariat adopted the CAP. The primary objective of this policy is to achieve 
(i) food security responses; (ii) product marketing; (iii) plant and animal diseases control; and (vi) 
cooperation and coordination in agricultural policies. The strategy therefore acknowledges the need 
for a holistic approach that deals with key elements of agricultural development, inputs, markets, 
institutions as well as infrastructure. To achieve this aim, the EU in partnership with other 
international organisations launched the market access initiative. The programme aims at ensuring 
that the Eastern and Southern African (ESA) region gets a fair deal in global agricultural trade 
arrangements.297 
b) East African Community (EAC) 
The EAC Agriculture and Rural Development Policy (EAC-ARDP) and Strategy (EAC-ARDS) were 
developed by the EAC Secretariat to boost regional agriculture development. Additionally, in August 
2011, negotiations for the development of an EAC CAADP compact was set in motion, which seeks to 
address the loopholes in the EAC-ARDS whiles providing added value to the EAC-ARDP (Rampaet al, 
2012: vi). Thus, due to the drought and associated hunger which plagued the East African region in 
2011, the EU reacted with a humanitarian aid from the earliest stages of the crisis. As of August 2011, 
the Union was providing around €1 billion towards addressing famine.298 With the Union’s 
humanitarian aid for the region in 2011 raised from €97 million to €158 million, the funds were used 
by the EAC to provide food and clean water to refugees in Kenya and Somalia.299 
c)  ECOWAS 
At the subregional level, considerable progress has been made with the implementation of the 
regional component of CAADP.300In West Africa, the process begun with the creation of an ECOWAS 
Common Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) in 2001 by the the ECOWAS Ministerial Commission on 
Agriculture. ECOWAP thus was adopted on 19 January 2005 as the reference framework for the 
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implementation of the CAADP Regional Partnership Compact (subsequently adopted in 2009). The 
prime objective of ECOWAP was to (i) enhance food security for the people in the region; (ii) involve 
producers in markets; (iii) intensify production systems in sustainable manner; (iv) reduce food 
dependence and achieving sovereignty; while (v) adopting appropriate funding mechanism for 
agricultural production. 
Yet, for purposes of implementation, ECOWAS leaders adopted the Regional Investment Plan (PRIA) 
between 2011-2015, of which they committed to contribute USD 150 million of the estimated USD 
900 million.301 It is therefore anticipated the EU and other international partners will provide the 
remaining USD 750 million for the project (van Seters, 2012). 
Further there is an ongoing process for the setting up of a Regional Fund for Agriculture and Food 
(ECOWADF) and Regional Agency for Food and Agriculture (RAFA) to facilitate the implementation of 
PRIA. Yet, though certain activities and sub-programmes strategised under the ECOWAP/CAADP and 
related food security initiatives have been commenced, their operationlisation has been slow due to 
lack of financial and personnel capacities. 
Food and fisheries production are the major challenges confronting West Africa, particularly with 
regards to food security and employment. This situation worsened particularly by the decrease in 
rainfall during the winter 2007-2008, leading to poor harvest in several part of the region. This 
shortcoming led to higher prices of imported food, specifically cereals. Therefore, on the 16 July 2014, 
the EU provided a financial support towards the implementation of an ECOWAS ‘Regional Food 
Security Reserve’. The initiative among others consists of operationalising a food security storage 
strategy to forestall or manage food emergencies. With a sum of €4.8 million from the Union, the sub-
regional organisation is expected to implement the ‘Aid support scheme for the decision and 
reinforcement of the capacities of the Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food’ which seeks to 
address the frequency and increasing gravity in of food and nutritional crises in the West African 
countries.302 
d) Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
The Horn of Africa has been considered as the most food insecure part of Africa, with approximately 
70 million individuals facing chronic hunger.303  For this reason, the IGAD Food Security Strategy was 
adopted in 1990 as a detailed programme for strengthening the region’s food security. Yet, despite 
several initiatives being adopted,304 these strategies did little to reduce food insecurity in the region 
mainly due to lack of secure source of funding.305 Thus, the signing of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement 
between the EU and the ACP countries was envisaged as one of the remedies for addressing this 
shortfall. The agreement affirmed food security as a key component within the context of the MDGs.  
In light of the abovementioned commitment, the European Commission and EU member states have 
provided financial support for the following projects (i) implementation of a sub-regional early 
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warning system (US$ 2.110 million); (ii) conducting of food security issues focusing on grain marketing 
(US$ 0.425 million); (iii) training for the monitoring of range and livestock resources by remote sensing 
in Arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) (US$ 2.500 million); (iv) development of afforestation systems for 
dryland areas (US$6. 000 million) and training in improved water irrigation management (US$ 2.470 
million).306 
Further, the Union has provided both political and financial supports to the IGAD Secretariat in 
addressing the ongoing famine crisis in South Sudan. Thus, considering that approximately 3.7 million 
people are severely food insecure in the country since the outbreak of the conflict in mid-December 
2013, the EU and its member states have pledged a financial package to the tune of € 110 million so 
far.307 
e) Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
The primary objective of food security in SADC region is sustainable access to adequate and safe food 
at all times. However, over the last decade, pests and diseases, drought, poverty and chronic disease 
have resulted in chronically inadequate food availability as well as lack of nutrition value. Against this 
backdrop, the organisation has adopted two key initiatives which seek to address food insecurity, 
namely, the (i) Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in the SADC Region; and 
(ii) SADC Action on Food Security.  
Against this background, the Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) established between the EU and 
the SADC countries has enhanced trade and free flow of goods among the countries by lowering tarrifs 
for selected goods on a common list. These goods include fertilizer, sugar, cashews, tea and coffee. 
This step has contributed to the reduction in food insecurity in the region.  
In March 2013, the PTA was subsequently complemented by the signing of the ‘Regional Economic 
Integration Support Programme (REIS)’ between the EU and the SADC Secretariat. With the 
overarching aim of reducing poverty and ensuring food security, the four year programme was 
financed to the tune of €19.6 million under the 10th EDF (SADC, 2012). Thus, the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as a component of the REIS creates awareness among farmers and 
exporters in SADC on SPS measures relevant to products traded within and outside the region.308The 
initiative further seeks to harmonize SADC’s SPS measures in line with international standards. This 
will in turn address the significant loss of potential traded revenue resulting from lack of compliance 
with SPS measures which undermines trade.  
5. EU initiatives 
As a ‘global player’ in human rights,309 the EU has continued to play a principal role in addressing 
African hunger and malnutrition, particularly through EU aid and development programmes which 
support supra-national agents such as the AU. Through article 21 of the TEU, the Union and its member 
states have made continuous pledges to include development objectives in their relations with third 
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countries, particularly in the area of food security. This legal obligation is underpinned by the 
European Consensus on Development (ECD), signed by the EU and its member states in 2005. Further, 
in 2009, the Union adopted its Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) Work Programme 2010-2013 
which sets out key thematic areas for engagement with third countries. With agri-food and fisheries 
as a priority area for the PCD, the EC adopted six principal policy areas to enhance their effective 
realization. These policies were accompanied with a set of targets and respective performance 
indicators with the objective facilitating their impact on the ground.  
Further in 2010, the EU put in place a Food and Nutrition Security Implementation Plan towards 
ensuring a harmonized EU-wide approach, with specific focus on six key priorities, namely: (i) enhance 
nutrition; (ii) resilience building; (iii) strengthen social protection mechanisms; (iv) improve 
smallholder resilience and rural livelihoods; (v) boost effective governance; and (vi) strengthen 
regional agriculture and food security policies.310 Consequently, with the aim of shaping the EU’s food 
security policy towards third countries inter alia in Africa, strategies to strengthen global food security, 
nutrition and resilience were adopted in 2011.311 The next sub-section provides an outline of the 
various policies adopted under the aegis of the AU-EU partnership to address food security. 
While sustained progress has been made in many regions in achieving MDG goal I, the EU Agenda for 
Action on MDGs adopted on 24 June 2008, observed that chronic hunger persisted especially in sub-
Saharan Africa. The paper calls on all donors (EU institutions and member states) to meet their 
respective aid commitments towards improving the financing gap for meeting the MDGs and 
alleviating starvation. This calls for an immediate and sustained action to be taken by the EU 
particularly in light of the south-south cooperation in leveraging the development gap between the 
two continents.  
The EU emphasized the significance of a country-based model, established on a solid country 
ownership, which is relevant for enhancing aid harmonization. Agriculture was identified as one of the 
priority areas of the Agenda which is envisaged as a key component of the 2007 JAES.312 
Regarding food intervention, the EU affirmed to address soaring food prices through assistance to 
improve farmers’ access to agricultural inputs, food assistance, social transfers and safety nets as well 
as intervention in using market-based risk management instruments. The paper further affirms the 
EUs commitment to bridge Africa’s financing gap in areas of agriculture, food security and rural 
development. This step is anticipated to result in an annual increase in agricultural productivity of 6 
percent (which is synonymous with the target set by the AU). The paper further affirmed the EUs 
support to the CAADP framework as well as strengthening of agricultural research and policy 
development at both national and regional levels in Africa.   
The EU has adopted a number a number of other initiatives such as the EU Action Plan to Reduce the 
Number of Stunted Children by 7 Million by 2025 which is linked to the CAADP nutrition country 
papers. The EU Action Plan on Agricultural Commodities, Dependence and Povertyseeks to provide 
intervention for countries and producers dependent on commodities such as coffee, cocoa, cotton 
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and sugar. The objective is to increase the earnings of African producers of these crops and reducing 
the vulnerability of incomes at both producer and macroeconomic levels.313 
The Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) provides food and nutrition interventions for the most 
vulnerable and world poorest populations. The FSTP has three strategic priorities, namely, through (i) 
research, technology transfer and innovation; (ii) strengthened governance approaches; and (iii) 
addressing food security for the poor and vulnerable in fragile situations. 
The EU Rapid Response to Food Prices Facility established in 2008 by the EU Parliament is aimed at (i) 
strengthening production capacity as well as agricultural governance in fragile states; (ii) improving 
availability and access to food products for vulnerable persons; and (iii) support food price stability. 
The EU and its member states have over the years donated a considerable amount of food aid to 
fragile states in Africa.314 The European Commission and several member states including Belgium, 
Netherlands, France, Germany and Ireland through the ECHA provide financial support to the AU and 
a range of NGOs to procure food in both emergency and non-emergency contexts as a way of 
supporting the growth of agriculture and livelihoods in AU states. The EC's Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection Department (ECHO) provides intervention in the form of seasonal cash transfers and other 
interventions.315 
6. Joint initiatives 
a) EAU4Food 
Funded by the 7th Framework Programme (FP7) of the EU, this is a cooperative research partnership 
between the EU and the AU to increase the production of food in irrigated farming systems in the 
African region. The initiative aims to address the enormous setbacks facing African agriculture through 
development of innovations. Aligning the geographical division of the region, the initiative is 
operationalised in four irrigated zones, namely, East Africa (Ethiopia), West Africa (Mali), Southern 
hemisphere (Mozambique and South Africa) and Northern hemisphere (Tunisia).  
The scheme broadly encompasses capacity building programmes inter alia scientific publications, 
policy briefs, presentations, school programmes and training of farmers by scientific personnel. At 
each site, primary indicators, biophysical parameters and farm strategies are carefully observed for 
identification of existing challenges to food security.  
It is anticipated that the innovation will impact significantly on wider policy processes at trans-national 
and national levels as well as agricultural production at farm levels. Consequently, this initiative will 
respond to the crises situation in Africa such as worsening poverty which resulted due to the hike in 
food prices in 2007 and 2008. 
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b) Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR)  
Launched in December 2012 in Ouagadougou, AGIR aims at achieving ‘Zero Hunger’ in the West Africa 
and the Sahel. The EU was a key partner in the establishment of the scheme. It was officially launched 
following a high-level meeting hosted by the EU on 18 June 2012 where the idea of an international 
alliance was presented. The alliance is composed of stakeholders from ECOWAS, West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) and the 
EU.316 The Union has subsequently been instrumental in its implementation, particularly through a 
continued financial and technical support (European Commission, 2014c).The four pillars of the 
programme are (i) improving the social protection for the most vulnerable households and 
communities; (ii) strengthening governance for food and nutritional security; (iii) improve vulnerable 
households’ access to food; and (iv) strengthening nutrition of vulnerable households. Following the 
adoption of the AGIR Regional Road Map on 9 April 2013 in Paris, the EU development aid 
Commissioner affirmed that the Union will commit €1.5 billion in funding for resilience in the 17 West 
African countries under the 11th EDF between 2014 and 2020.317 
7. Conclusions 
Even though the EU has made reasonable progress in establishing norms and initiatives fundamental 
for Africa’s food security, challenges still persist in the operationalization of EU-AU agricultural 
partnership. Interventions in the form of financial support for African-developed programmes are 
welcome but the impact of EU policies such as the CAP and negotiation over EPAs on food security 
must also be considered.318 Agricultural rules linked to trade agreements may impact African farmers 
negatively in their access to the European market or in extreme cases even lead small-scale farmers 
to being prohibted from sowing seeds generated by them.319 
B. Human rights defenders320 
1. Introduction 
By fighting for the advancement, fulfilment and recognition of human rights, human rights defenders 
(HRD) are essential components to ensuring the universality of human rights. HRD are individuals or 
groups of individuals who promote and strive for the protection and realisation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms at the national or international levels.321  By their actions, HRD therefore help 
ensure that the lofty obligations undertaken by governments at the international level are respected 
domestically. This important domestic role of HRD has been recognised up to the level of the United 
Nations (UN) through the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders as well as the subsequent 
appointment of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights Defenders.322  At the 
                                                          
316 Global Alliance for Resilience ‘Global alliance for resilience-Sahel and West Africa’ (9 April 2013)  < 
http://www.oecd.org/site/rpca/agir/AGIR%20plaquette_EN_pagebypage.pdf>. 
317European Commission (n 315) 4. 
318Olivier De Schutter, and Kaitlin Y. Cordes (eds.) Accounting for hunger: the right to food in the era of globalisation. 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011, 137-192. 
319 See the 1991 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. 
320See also the case study in relation to human rights defenders in D5.1. 
321 Art 1 of the 1998 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and 
Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
322 United Nations ‘Human Rights Defenders: protecting the right to defend human rights’ (2004) 18. 
FRAME    Deliverable No. 5.4 
59 
 
same time, due to the nature of their activities, HRD often find themselves under attacks from both 
state and non-state actors, who feel threatened by the questions raised by HRD and by the subsequent 
empowerment of the people through increased access to information and a growing consciousness. 
HRD and members of their entourage therefore find themselves at risk of attacks in more than eighty 
countries in the world.323  
In recognition of the role played by HRD and in a bid to ensure their safety, the EU has focused its 
attention on the plight of HRD in the world. One of the best examples is the adoption in 2004 and the 
subsequent revision in 2008 of the European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders. Over the 
years, these Guidelines have been complemented by country specific strategies on human rights, the 
creation of posts devoted to HRD in the EU delegations and the provision of financial assistance 
through the EIDHR.324 Other Guidelines issued by the EU such as the 2014 EU Human Rights Guidelines 
on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline, the 2013 Guidelines to Promote and Protect the 
Enjoyment of all Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons, 
the 2013 Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, the 2012 
Guidelines on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and the 2008 
Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against 
them also support HRD directly or indirectly. Alongside, the EU has always aimed at promoting 
regionalism. Being itself a product of the process of regionalism, the EU has sought to further inter-
regional relations by encouraging the set-up and the professionalisation of regional intergovernmental 
organisations (IOs) around the world.325  In this context, it is of no surprise that the EU has sought to 
advance both agendas by advancing the protection of HRD through intergovernmental organisations. 
This section will investigate how the EU has interacted with African IOs for the benefit of HRD through 
two main initiatives: the JAES and the Cotonou Agreement as well as through the dialogues instituted 
with sub-regional African IOs. The position put forward by the EU towards HRD will be contrasted with 
the practical results obtained. In order to obtain as clear a picture as possible, this case study will start 
by reviewing the instruments adopted by the EU and African IOs for the express benefit of HRD. 
 
2. Instruments adopted by the EU 
a) EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders 
The aim of the EU Guidelines on HRD is to provide practical suggestions on how the position adopted 
towards HRD by the EU can be put into action for an enhanced protection of the human rights of HRD. 
In its relationship with third party states, the EU thus aims at influencing those states towards 
protecting HRD. States are to be encouraged to adhere and comply with the relevant international 
norms and obligations, in particular with the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. The 
Guidelines are applicable in contacts with third countries as well as in multilateral fora.326  According 
to the Guidelines, the political dialogues between the EU and regional organisations must, where 
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relevant, focus on HRD. The EU support to HRD and their work is to be underlined as well as individual 
cases of concern raised.  Regional mechanisms which aim at protecting HRD are also to be 
strengthened or created when non-existent. 
In June 2014, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the EU Guidelines on HRD, 
the Council of the European Union issued a number of conclusions. While noting with satisfaction the 
increase in effectiveness and coherence of the EU's actions towards HRD since the adoption of the 
Guidelines, the Council pointed out to the shrinking space available to HRD in numerous states as well 
as to new dangers such as online surveillance. The Council also highlighted the role and importance of 
international mechanisms in protecting HRD such as those set into place by the AU.327 
b) Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all 
Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender 
and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons 
The 2013 Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons were enacted in reaction to the discrimination, 
social as well as legal, suffered by LGBTI persons in numerous parts of the world. These Guidelines 
recognise the special vulnerability faced by HRD working towards advancing the human rights of LGBTI 
persons.328  As such, officials of EU institutions and EU member states are encouraged to raise the issue 
of the human rights of LGBTI in the human rights component of political dialogue, with special 
attention being paid to cases of proven or alleged violations on the persons of HRD.329 
c) EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression 
Online and Offline 
The 2014 EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline aims at providing 
political and operational guidance to EU officials as well as to EU member states in their interaction 
with third parties and in international fora on the topic of freedom of expression.330  Recognizing that 
human rights are indivisible, the 2014 Guidelines are to be read in conjunction with previously written 
guidelines.331  The Guidelines point out to the EU support for the work of the AU Special Rapporteur 
on Freedom of Expression, wishing to encourage strong cross-regional support on the matter.332 
3. Instruments adopted by African IOs 
a) Grand-Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action 
The Grand-Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action was adopted at the First OAU Ministerial 
Conference on Human Rights in April 1999. The Conference recognised that the development and 
energisation of the civil society should be seen as the building blocks in the construction of an 
environment respectful of human rights. It also noted the adoption of the UN Declaration on the 
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Protection of Human Rights Defenders by the UN Commission on Human Rights, calling it a 'significant 
turning point'. Member states were encouraged to take appropriate steps towards the implementation 
of the Declaration in Africa. States were also urged to guarantee a free and independent press so as to 
enable the latter to perform its role as a promoter and protector of human rights. 
b) Kigali Declaration 
The Kigali Declaration was adopted by the first AU Ministerial Conference on Human Rights in Africa in 
May 2003. The Declaration recognises the important role of civil society organisations and particularly 
of HRD in the promotion and protection of human rights. It calls upon both member states and regional 
organisations to protect them. By transforming the protection of HRD into not only a national, but a 
regional concern, ministers of AU member states have shown that they recognise the important role 
played by HRD. States were again called upon to guarantee the freedom of the media through 
appropriate legislative and policy measures. 
c) Resolutions of the African Commission 
The 2002 Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa recalled the importance of 
freedom of expression and access to information for greater public transparency and accountability, 
good governance and a strengthened democracy in Africa.333  States were reminded of their obligation 
to prevent, investigate and punish any attack upon the media.334  
The 2004 Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders in Africa built upon the Grand Bay 
and Kigali Declarations but focused exclusively on HRD. Recognising the contribution of HRD in the 
areas of human rights, democracy and rule of law and noting with concern that HRD are negatively 
impacted through threats, attacks and acts of intimidation, the African Commission also appointed a 
Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders through this declaration. Members of the Commission 
were furthermore called upon to mainstream the issue of HRD in their activities. 
The Resolution on the mandate and appointment of a special rapporteur on freedom of expression in 
Africa was passed in 2004. The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression in Africa was granted the 
mandate to make public interventions where violations to the right to freedom of expression were 
brought to his notice. 
The 2011 Resolution on Human Rights Defenders in Africa was more explicit than the 2004 Resolution. 
This might have been brought upon by the recognition that the working environment of HRD in Africa 
is still fraught with persistent acts of arbitrary arrest and detention, acts of harassment, extra-judicial 
executions and acts of torture. In this resolution, states were called upon to recognise the role played 
by HRD and encouraged to adopt specific legislations for their protection. The release of arbitrarily 
detained HRD was also called for as well as the initiation of independent investigations and 
prosecutions in cases of violations on the person of HRD. 
4. The AU-EU human rights dialogue and HRD 
The JAES provides for a structured AU-EU human rights dialogue, allowing for an exchange of views 
on human rights issues of concern to both sides as well as for the sharing of best practices.  This formal 
dialogue is recognised as the 'key framework for dialogue' in the JAES on issues of human rights 
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between Europe and Africa.335 There has been a regular dialogue since 2008 and every annual dialogue 
has focused on rights of particular concern to HRD. In 2009 in Addis Ababa, both parties agreed to 
cooperate further in the mapping of legislation regarding civil society organisation as agreed in the 
human rights dialogues of April 2009.336  This shows a degree of follow-up effected by both parties, 
thereby pointing to a higher probability for the transformation of declarations into actions. In 2010, 
the dialogue included freedom of association and expression as issues of common concern.337  In 2011 
in Senegal, both parties reaffirmed the importance of collaboration on key issues such as the 
protection of HRD. Within the framework of the Dialogue, a working group met in Tunis in December 
2011 to discuss freedom of expression, with an emphasis on the role of the media in the promotion 
of democratic change. The following year, in November, the dialogue in Addis Ababa identified 
freedom of association as a theme on which cooperation should be intensified.338  In 2013 in Belgium, 
focus was again placed on freedom of association through a common agreement to organise a 
workshop as well as the pledge by the EU to support the activities of the ACHPR Working Group on 
Freedom of Association. 
The inclusion of these rights of special concern to HRD is in keeping with the policy of the EU which 
considers freedom of expression, the role of civil society and the protection of HRD as priority issues 
that should be included in every dialogue.339  It is also quite encouraging for African HRD to see those 
rights included as issues of common concern rather than being a one-sided dialogue. The presence of 
civil society representatives at some of the dialogues also show the value placed on CSOs by both 
parties.340  It ensures that the rights of concern to civil society such as freedom of expression and 
freedom of association remain primary focuses. Additionally, their presence help ensure 
accountability: CSOs have a special interest in holding both parties accountable to any declaration or 
decision taken in support of HRD. The EU-AU dialogue is however not without flaws. The EU-AU 
dialogue is mainly concerned with the broader picture on both continents such as the adoption of 
common positions, overall policies and reciprocal developments in the area of human rights. The 
dialogue is not concerned with country-specific situations.341  Immediately this shows a great lacuna 
as the EU and the AU cannot decide jointly to apply diplomatic pressure or sanctions upon a member 
state which violates the right of HRD. Most violations occur at country-level and the inability to discuss 
specific countries is a great blow to the practical ability to effect change by the EU-AU dialogue. 
5. Dialogue with states under the Cotonou Agreement 
Created under article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, human rights dialogues provide for the respect for 
human rights as a basis for continued assessment. The 'comprehensive, balanced and deep political 
dialogue’ has the potential to be a driver for change by confronting African states to new norms and 
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by challenging rigid power structures. It is unfortunate that the AU is not invited and therefore not 
present during those political dialogues. The plight of HRD has been raised in this context with 
countries such as the Gambia,342 but neither the AU nor any other sub regional organisations were 
included. The exclusion of the AU from those dialogues prevents a country-specific focus as well as 
prevents any follow-up by the AU. 
Political dialogue has however been taking place with the AU, but has until now focused on issues of 
peace and security only rather than human rights. This is in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement 
itself where the role of the AU in the political dialogue is only explicitly mentioned with regards to the 
objectives of peace and democratic stability.343 
6. The African Union Support Programme 
The African Union Support Programme providing support to among others the African Commission 
and African Court is important in order to strengthen these bodies. The African Commission has in the 
past recognised the 'crucial contribution of the work of human right defenders' and in recognition of 
this created the post of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders in Africa.344  The African 
Commission has also rendered opinions which support the rights and freedoms of HRD such as in Huri-
Laws v Nigeria where the harassment endured by the employees of an NGO and the raid on their office 
were deemed a violation of the right to freedom of expression and of association as guaranteed under 
the African Charter.345  Some of the early cases of the African Court have dealt with issues clearly linked 
to HRD such as, the right to freedom of association,346 the right to freedom of expression and the 
pubishment of defamation under criminal law.347 
7. Areas of concern 
The 2014-2017 JAES roadmap, which structures continent-to-continent cooperation by setting out the 
keys priority areas, does not include the protection of HRD as a key area of cooperation. This is but a 
continuation of the situation applicable upon the adoption of the 2011-2013 Action Plan of the JAES, 
where the protection of HRD was also not mentioned. The first 2008-2010 Action Plan of the JAES did 
however have as one of its four objectives the empowerment of non-state actors and the creation of 
an enabling environment to enable them to play an active role in democracy building and 
development.348  The protection of HRD was however not mentioned in the priority activities towards 
enhancing dialogue in the area of human rights, although other rights such as the children rights and 
women rights were explicitly mentioned.349 Additionally, the role, power and driving force of the AU 
must also not be overstated in the cooperation. For the 2014 Summit, Egypt which is suspended from 
the AU and Morocco who left the organisation twenty years ago were invited. Responding to these 
concerns, EU officials replied that this is precisely the reason why the Summit is named Africa-EU 
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rather than AU-EU.350 
8. Conclusion 
The above discussion sketched a brief overview of the EU engagement with Africa in the area of HRD. 
The EU has recognised the importance of advancing the cause of HRD and civil society in Africa through 
diplomacy as well as through the grant of funds. However, more can be done and civil society has 
made repeated calls to that effect.  A recent memorandum issued by Human Right Watch (HRW) called 
on the EU-AU human rights dialogue to focus on the plight of human right defenders in Africa and on 
the violations of the related rights to freedom of association, expression and peaceful assembly.351  In 
fact, this call is not the first of its kind. In 2007, before the AU-EU Lisbon Summit, the Observatory for 
the Protection of Human Rights Defenders called on both parties to concentrate on the plight of HRD 
and to call for an end of any kind of repression and oppression against them.352  These repeated calls 
of themselves show that the efforts of both the EU and the AU could be improved. Both the EU and 
the AU must not shy away from engaging African countries on specific cases of conern, rather than 
remaining on a general level.  
                                                          
350Nicholas Kotch 'Zuma withdraws from Africa-EU summit' 1 April 2014 
Bdlivehttp://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2014/04/01/zuma-withdraws-from-eu-africa-summit . 
351 Human Rights Watch 'Memorandum on human rights priorities for the European Union-Africa summit' (2014) 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/31/memorandum-human-rights-priorities-european-union-africa-summit. 
352 Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders ‘Strategy EU-Africa Supporting human rights defenders in sub-
Saharan Africa' translated from ‘Stratégie UE-Afrique Soutenir les défenseurs des droits de l'Homme en Afrique 
subsaharienne' (2007). 
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VIII. Conclusions 
The report has explored how the relationship between the EU and the AU and other African regional 
IOs has become more equal in recent years and that Africa is now treated as one unit, represented by 
the AU. The main vehicle for this renewed partnership is the Joint Africa-EU Strategy which was 
adopted in 2007, two years after the EU Strategy for Africa, which provided that EU should work 
through African institutions. The AU on its side has worked on creating greater coherence among its 
goverance institutions through the AGA. However, in part due just to the sheer number of actors 
involved in EU-Africa relations, including EU and AU member states, AU institutions, RECs and civil 
society actors, it is not surprising that challenges remain in relation to making the relationship 
functioning effectively.  
The main human rights priorities of the EU are set out in eleven thematic human rights guidelines. 
One of the ways in which the EU tries to influence human rights practices is through human rights 
dialogue. While human rights dialogue generally takes place with third states human rights is also a 
topic in political dialogue with international organisations. The formal human rights dialogue which 
takes place at the political level between the EU and AU has become less confrontational in recent 
years as the EU no longer tries to impose the agenda as both parties have agreed to discuss the topics 
of concern to the other side.353 
The first official evaluation of the strategy by the two Commissions was still pending at the time of 
writing.354A 2014 study commissioned by the European Parliament notes that there is a lack of 
‘political traction because of serious divergence on trade, international justice, governance and 
cultural cooperation’.355 
The lack of consistency in EU-Africa relations can perhaps be most clearly seen in relation to migration 
to the EU, an issue that the EU has not been very interested in discussing with the AU at a multilateral 
level, preferring bilateral discussions.356 However, it should be noted that the EU in recent years have 
become more open to discuss agenda points put forward by both sides.357 The move from a technical 
to a political dialogue, with the Commissioner for Political Affairs leading the AU delegation and the 
EU Special Representative on Human Rights leading the EU delegation, has however not only been 
positive as meetings have often been postponed due to scheduling problems.358 
With regard to effectiveness, it is clear that the EU and the AU and other African IOs share a 
commitment to human rights. However, the commitment of many AU member states remains more 
rhetorical than practical. With regard to finding common positions on human rights issues for example 
in UN bodies, the partnership has not been very successful. There are clearly underlying differences 
between the two sides with regard to issues such as international criminal law and LGBTI rights. In 
terms of financing the main focus is on security but the EU and its member states are major 
contributors to strengthening the African governance institutions. However, coordination among 
                                                          
353 Interview with AU official, May 2015. 
 
355European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department ‘The implementation of the Joint Africa 
Europe Strategy: Rebuilding confidence and commitments’, EXPO/B/AFET/2013/42, April 2014. 
356Interview with AU official, May, 2015. 
357Ibid. 
358Ibld. 
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donors could be better. The AU is trying to move away from being overly dependent on donors but 
the commitment of member states to the AU institutions could clearly be improved. As an example 
the programme activities of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is completely 
funded through donors.  
The report illustrate through two case studies how the EU and its member states have engaged the 
AU and other African IOs on two human rights related issues, improved food security and the 
protection of human rights defenders. The issue of food security illustrate well the lack of consistency 
in the EU’s approach to Africa where it is promoting access to the right to food through support to 
numerous initiatives on the continent but at the same time may contribute to limiting access to food 
for some groups through policies such as the common agricultural policy and positions taken in 
relation to negotiations over the economic partnership agreements. The case study on human rights 
defenders illustrate how the dialogue between the EU and AU has inadequately dealt with an issue 
that should be high on the EU’s agenda in light of its human rights guidelines and where the AU clearly 
also has shown a commitment at the level of adoption of human rights instruments. However, in 
practice violations of the rights of human rights defenders continue unabated illustrating the limits of 
both bilateral and multilateral human rights dialogue. 
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